THE IMPACT OF THE 1973 OCTOBER WAR ON ISRAELI POLICY
# AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICY

FINAL REPORT

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The 1973 October War, and the events that followed, have had a profound impact on virtually all aspects of Israeli society, including Israel's defense posture, its diplomatic flexibility, and the political climate within which its key decision-makers operate. This report analyzes the impact of the 1973 this war and its aftermath on Israeli defense, security and settlement policy within the context of the broad social, political and military environment existing in Israel, since these societal forces serve to shape and limit both Israeli,

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policy and the demands placed on the United States as Israel's principal arms supplier and as agent for securing peace in the Middle East.

The conclusions of this report are:

(1) The war and its aftermath have left Israeli society deeply divided over security issues. Differences over these issues are reflected in the party system and within the top political and military leadership.

(2) As a result of the 1973 elections, Prime Minister Rabin leads a weak government lacking in party support and public support. Shimon Peres has emerged as the pivotal leader, and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon as the weakest of the three major leaders.

(3) The military and psychological mood of the country has been depressed since October 1973, and only recently has public faith in the IDF leadership been restored. The government has done little to prepare the Israeli public for the type of agreements and concessions that will be required for an overall settlement.

(4) The range of security and settlement options open to the Israeli leadership is limited as a result of the foregoing. Flexibility is limited.

(5) The present structure and operation of the U.S.-Israeli relationship has created uncertainty in Israel, further limiting flexibility.

(6) Shifts in Israeli policy or flexibility are unlikely in the near term. The factors that might increase the likelihood of policy change include a major change in the present government coalition (such as by broadening its base) and a modification of the structure and operation of the American-Israeli relationship.

Part One ~~of this report~~ addresses the fundamental questions of: (1) how Israeli defense, security and settlement policy is in fact formulated; (2) which publics exert influence and how much; and (3) what tensions exist among these groups.

Part Two describes and analyzes how the key publics, political parties and their fundamental policies serve to constrain Israel's political and military leadership with respect to present and future policy, especially a settlement with the Arab states.

Part Three contains the analysis of the potential for U. S. policy-makers, based on the centrifugal forces operating in Israeli society and their impact on the political and military leadership.

PREFACE

The present analysis of developments within Israel since the 1973 October War is intended to serve both as a reference work on the Israeli decision-making process in the defense and security area, and as a tool for U.S. defense planners who must interact with this process and the personalities in the Israeli leadership.

This work, both in concept and execution, has had the benefit of discussions with James Noyes, Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr., Lt. Col. Thomas A. Pianka, Lt. Cdr. Gary G. Sick, Robert H. Kubal and Jerrold K. Milsted in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), sponsor of this research, and Andrew W. Marshall, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment). The author wishes to express his gratitude to each of these individuals.

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Drafts of this Report were originally completed as follows:
Part I (December 1974); Part II (February 1975); and Part III
(April 1975). Developments through June 1975 have been incorporated
into this Final Report.

A.R.W.

SUMMARY

The 1973 October War, and the events that followed, have had a profound impact on virtually all aspects of Israeli society, including Israel's defense posture, its diplomatic flexibility, and the political climate within which its key decision-makers operate. The purpose of this report is to analyze the impact of the 1973 war and its aftermath on Israeli defense, security and settlement policy within the context of the broad social, political and military environment existing within Israel, since these societal forces serve to shape and limit both Israeli policy and the demands placed on the United States as Israel's principal arms supplier and as agent for securing peace in the Middle East.

This report reaches the following major conclusions which are of importance to the making of American defense policy, and to the ongoing American/Israeli relationship:

● The analysis further confirms earlier findings that the 1973 October War and its aftermath have left Israeli society deeply divided and fragmented over a series of fundamental security issues, such as changes in the attitudes of the Arab world; the use of force-centered and accomodation-centered modes of dealing with the Arab states; and the role of the United States in securing Israel's existence within secure and recognized borders. Differences over these and other issues have given rise to a set of centrifugal forces among Israel's "key publics", or major societal groups, which are to a major extent reflected in the nation's multi-party political system, as well as within the top

political and military leadership.

• Under the results of the 1973 Knesset (Parliament) elections, and the present coalition, Premier Rabin heads a weak government which lacks the strong support of its own members, majority support in the Knesset, and the popular support of the Israeli public. Personally, Rabin does not control either his own Labor Party or a majority in the Knesset, and is far to the "left" of the electorate on most settlement issues. For personal, as well as policy reasons, Defense Minister Peres has emerged as the pivotal leader, with the support of not only the military but a strong majority in the Knesset and the electorate as well. Where Rabin seeks an Arab document pledging non-belligerancy, Peres emphasizes the goal of substantive "elements" of non-belligerancy which would include specific acts by the Arab states and Israel to reduce tension and increase the security of the area. Here Peres is in a position to exercise enormous control over any Israeli policy and action. Foreign Minister Allon has emerged as the weakest of the three "top" leaders, exercising minimal control over major policy decisions. All of the top leadership support the overall return to borders approximating those of June 4, 1967 under conditions of settlement, and differ largely with respect to material timing and specific prerequisites.

• Largely because of the perceived "disaster" of the 1973 war, the military/psychological mood of the country has been extremely depressed since October 1973, and only recently has public morale and faith in the IDF leadership been restored to any appreciable degree. Although the new government has taken extensive action to correct problems in the IDF since

1973, it has done little to prepare the Israeli public for the type of agreements and concessions that will be required for an overall settlement. The only viable military alternative left for the IDF within these parameters may be yet another pre-emptive war.

● The net impact of this interrelated political, military and psychological climate has been to severely restrict the range of security and settlement options open to the Israeli leadership. Here the military realities presently limit major geographic concessions by Israel in the absence of an overall settlement. Even under such a settlement, the IDF views a return to the June 4, 1967 borders as highly risky, although it has not opposed such as return.

● The present structure and operation of the American/Israeli relationship has given rise to increased and substantial uncertainty among the key Israeli leadership and the Israeli public over the nature and reliability of the American commitment to Israel as well as long run United States interests in the area. This uncertainty over Israeli borders, and to what extent the United States will guarantee Israeli security as part of its own national interest, has served to further limit potential policy flexibility of the Israeli leadership, and exacerbated public reaction to American efforts to achieve a compromise.

● The probability of any substantial shift in Israeli policy and policy flexibility will remain low in the near term. Factors which would increase the probability of significant policy changes include:

(1) Major changes in the present government coalition which would provide a broader political base for the government, and remove the Likud bloc as an opposition force. The most likely possibility for such a change would be the formation of a national

unity government.

(2) Modification of the structure and operation of the American/ Israeli relationship, instituting changes to reduce Israeli uncertainty, eliminate severe "noise" problems, and restore the confidence of the broad range of the Israeli leadership and public in the United States.

In an effort to present U.S. defense planners with a range of options that will best utilize what flexibility exists in light of these forces, in favor of a political settlement in the Middle East, this report looks at the changes that have taken place in Israeli society since the 1973 war, as well as shifts in the political and military leadership.

Part One of this report addresses the fundamental questions of (1) how Israeli defense, security and settlement policy is in fact formulated, (2) which key publics exert influence, or are capable of exerting influence over policy-making, and to what extent they do so, and (3) what tensions or centrifugal forces exist among these groups which serve to limit policy. After identifying those key publics which figure prominently in the making of defense, security and settlement policy, this part describes these policy origins, the nature and method of influence these publics use, and the impact of the 1973 war on the interests and perceptions of these groups.

Part Two analyzes how the key publics, political parties and their fundamental policies serve to constrain Israel's political and military leadership. Of particular importance here are the crucial issues of policy concessions and settlement with the Arab states.

Part Three contains an analysis of the potential for American influence on the political and military leadership. Based on the limited

flexibility which currently exists within the Israeli leadership, this part concludes with a set of recommendations for U.S. defense planners, that will capitalize on the flexibility identified, directed toward the goal of achieving a settlement in the Middle East.

Virtually any American policy must contain three major components:

(1) <u>Political Support</u>: The basic elements of American political support for Israel are generally seen as composed of: (a) fundamental support of Israel's right to continued existence within secure and recognized borders; (b) Israel's right to continued occupation of captured Arab territories in the absence of nonbelligerency or a negotiated settlement; (c) use of American influence, and veto if necessary, to block severely anti-Israeli action in the United Nations; and (d) use of American political and economic power with third parties to mitigate the impact of Arab anti-Israeli programs. While the U.S. is committed to supporting each of these interests to greater or lesser extent, the nature and force given to all but (1) offer some room for maneuver in U.S. policy. Of these, the U.S. would presently appear to have the most leverage with regard to policy on the retention of occupied territories, and the specific final borders it is willing to guarantee Israel.

(2) <u>Military Assistance</u>: As both Israel's principal arms supplier and an agent for securing a negotiated settlement, the United States is placed in a sensitive position. On the one hand it is committed to helping Israel maintain the strategic balance in the Middle East, and on the other, securing a settlement among the adverse parties.

Within these parameters, there is some latitude for maintaining Israel's security and utilizing military assistance for policy purposes as well. To be effective, any such policy must be closely coordinated with other policy elements and measures to reduce uncertainty and "noise".

(3) <u>Economic Aid</u>: In light of the serious economic situation within Israel, which is both an internal one and one related to the Middle East conflict, the United States is in a position to exercise some influence over Israeli policy flexibility and settlement conditions through economic means.

Through a careful development and structuring of an overall American policy, each of these elements can be utilized to help bring about a more flexible Israeli policy by reducing the value of force-centered Israeli policy options, and increasing Israel's ability to maintain her security under a negotiated settlement.

CONTENTS

PART ONE

IMPACT OF THE 1973 WAR ON KEY ISRAELI GROUPS

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Project

Crucial to the analysis of American policy options and United Sates defense planning in the Middle East is an understanding of the making of Israeli defense, security and settlement policy: The dynamic forces within Israeli society which determine both policy flexibility and the fundamental policy parameters for Israel's political and military leadership. As Israel's principal arms supplier, and as agent for the establishment of peace and security in the region, the United States plays a critical role in both the formulation and implementation of Israeli policies, as well as their integration with the policies of the Arab states.

In order to recommend to U.S. defense planners a range of American options that maximize the flexibility of the Israeli leadership in favor of an overall settlement which meets both Israeli and American security interests, this Report analyzes the major groups and centrifugal forces in Israeli society, as well as shifts in the political and military leadership, in light of the outcome and aftermath of the 1973 October War.

This part of the report addresses the questions of: (1) how Israeli defense, security and settlement policy is in fact formulated, and (2) what major societal groups or key publics in Israel exert influence over policy-making and provide the dynamic tensions which presently exist in that nation. Specifically, section 1.2 goes on to identify those key publics which figure most prominantly in policy-making, while section 1.3 describes the various modes and extent of influence exerted by these

groups in terms of centrifugal forces on the leadership. Finally section 1.4 considers the impact of the 1973 October War and its aftermath on these groups and policy-making. The focus of this analysis is on the interests and perceptions of these groups and their leaders with regard to:

(a) The extent to which the views of these groups have shifted from force-centered to accomodation-centered modes of dealing with the Arab states;

(b) Changes in the perceptions of the role of the major powers (particularly the United States) in Israeli security and the Middle East region;

(c) The salience of war, defense policy and settlement options as elements in Israeli politics.

Part Two of the Report describes and analyzes how the key publics and the centrifugal forces their fundamental policies create constrain Israel's political and military leadership with respect to defense, security and settlement policy-making. Of particular importance here are the pressures these groups place on the leadership regarding basic approaches to and issues of settlement with the Arab states.

Part Three of the Report evaluates the implications of the Israeli decision process and societal forces for United States defense policy, and examines the options available to U.S. defense planners which best utilize the flexibility available in the Israeli leadership to promote an overall settlement and the strategic balance in the Middle East region. Included in this analysis are the incentives and assurances which the United States can offer to promote an overall settlement, as well as

maintain the long-run security of Israel.

Overview of Israeli Policy-Making

Fundamental to the analysis of how societal groups influence policy-making is an understanding of current policy, to the extent that it is formalized, and the process by which it has been formulated. Given United States interests in the Middle East region, it is essential that American defense planners be aware of how Israeli policy, including both crisis decisions and overall settlement approaches, is made. This is particularly so in view of the changes that the 1973 war and its aftermath have brought about in both Israeli policy and the policy-making process.

The 1973 war experience and its aftermath raise a number of important questions that have a direct bearing on Israel's future defense, security and settlement policy, as well as its approach to negotiations with the Arabs.[1] In part the answers to these questions will serve to define Israel's ultimate approach to settlement as well as the options open to the United States to promote a settlement to the Arab/Israeli conflict and maintain the strategic balance in the area.

Since the establishment of Israel as a sovereign state in 1948, deep hostility toward it (and earlier toward the changing demography of Mandate Palestine) on the part of the surrounding Arab population has led to a strong Israeli sense of insecurity. Coupled with a distrust of the major powers based on historical factors, as well as major ideological divisions and tensions within Israeli society, the result was

a regional foreign policy based on force and active deterrence, and a defense policy based on self-reliance to the greatest extent possible.[2] In light of military successes from 1948 to 1973, this policy has found widespread, although not universal, support in Israel.[3] Support for this policy, however, must be viewed apart from support for the process by which it was reached. As discussed below, this process has been under internal pressure at least since May 1967 and was the cause of a political crisis of major proportions in Israel both in May 1967 and again following the 1973 war.

The 1973 war significantly altered Israeli perceptions of themselves, the Arab states, and the super powers.[4] Major shifts occurred in the perception of Arab aims and abilities, and the role and resolve of the United States, as well as the capabilities of Israel's domestic political and military leadership. Further, the introduction of new weapons systems, higher equipment and casualty loss rates, and other related military factors has also brought about marked changes in Israeli perceptions of the general strategic environment.[5]

Considering first how Israeli policy is formulated, it can be seen that the decision-making process has undergone a considerable amount of analysis and revision in the course of Israel's history. While the evolution of this decision process prior to the 1973 war has already been explored at length,[6] it is worthwhile to review briefly a number of significant changes as illustrative of the problems which have emerged in the contemporary context and Israel's attempts to meet them.

From 1948 through the end of 1953 policy-making in the defense and security and foreign policy areas was concentrated in the hands of David Ben-Gurion, who held both the Prime Minister's and Defense portfolios, with limited authority delegated to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett. During this period, the Cabinet generally acquiesed to Ben-Gurion, and few lines of influence existed for any key public holding views different from his.

From 1954 to mid-1956, the Cabinet became increasingly influential because of Ben-Gurion's "semi-retirement" and Sharett's practice of bringing all policy questions before it. Here some key publics began to exert influence, particularly in the making of foreign policy. Sharp domestic divisions emerged in 1957 following Ben-Gurion's decision to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza, although such influence was insufficient to bring about any genuine consideration of policy alternatives. Ben-Gurion reasserted his total dominance in 1956 and maintained control until his last resignation in June 1963. While Ben-Gurion held absolute control over policy-making, a number of individuals did come to play important roles in the shaping of high level decisions. This group included Levi Eshkol and Pinhas Sapir in the economic area; Golda Meir in the political/diplomatic realm; Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres, and Yigal Allon in military matters; and finally, Abba Eban in the field of foreign affairs.

From 1964 through May 1967, under Prime Minister Eshkol, the Ministerial Committee on Security and Defense (MCSD), in actuality a subset of the full Cabinet, emerged as the principal decision-making body with

Eshkol serving as "first among equals". During this period the MCSD formulated government policy with actual decisions being ratified by majority vote in the full Cabinet. Under Eshkol the MCSD was informed at the "highest levels" and served as a genuine decision-making mechanism. Prior to May 1967 the MCSD and Cabinet enjoyed broad-based national support, and there was limited cause for the key publics to exert influence for alternative policies.

The crisis of May 1967, which culminated in the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War, witnessed extreme dissatisfaction with Eshkol's policy as well as his apparent failure to reach a decision that an increasing number of key publics thought necessary for the survival of the State, that is, the launching of a pre-emptive strike on Egypt and Syria. Here it was the intense feeling of several key publics, utilizing the Knesset, Cabinet and press as modes of influence, that brought about changes in the Government, the MCSD, and defense policy. Coincident with the decision to go to war in 1967 was the enlargement of the Cabinet and MCSD to include the opposition parties and the formation of a Government of national unity which lasted until 1970.

The opportunity for various members of the MCSD, as representatives of various key publics, to influence policy-making was now far greater than at any previous time. In the words of opposition member Menachem Begin:

> ...it (the MCSD) actually made decisions. Every member could express opinions and they were taken seriously. If he desired, each member could bring his motion to a vote in the full Cabinet.[7]

Even with this broadening of the Government in 1967, it is important to note that from 1948 through the outbreak of war in October 1973 the making of strategic level decisions was concentrated in the hands of a small, relatively homogeneous group of eighteen persons. Most had arrived in Palestine even before the British Mandate and were predominant throughout the first twenty years of independence, sharing a common perception often referred to as "the Second Aliya (the 1904-14 wave of Jewish immigration) mentality". Only four of these were native born "sabras" -- Allon, Dayan, Rabin and Yadlin. Thus, if there was influence during this time, it was limited to those key publics which shared the background and views of the entrenched political and military leadership.

Following Eshkol's death in 1969 and the accession of Golda Meir to the Prime Ministry, policy-making again became highly concentrated. As former Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir took a more personal and decisive role in foreign affairs than Eshkol had. Trusting only a few of her closest colleagues and staff, the MCSD was relegated to a nominal role. By 1970 membership of the MCSD included almost the entire Cabinet, and by 1973 the MCSD ceased to be the mechanism of policy-making.

Central to decision-making under Mrs. Meir was a small, informal group consisting of the Prime Minister and a few of her closest colleagues. While unfixed, this group usually included: Golda Meir (Prime Minister), Israel Galili (Minister without portfolio), Moshe Dayan (Minister of Defense), and Yidal Allon (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education). From time to time other individuals such

as General David Elazar (IDF Chief of Staff) and Abba Eban (Foreign Minister) participated. To the extent that the various key publics were represented in this small group, they were able to exert direct influence over policy formulation.

The last decisions taken by the "Kitchen Cabinet" were those surrounding the outbreak of war on 6 October 1973. Meir, Galili, and Dayan advised by CoS Gen. Elazar and IDF Intelligence Chief Zeira, took the fundamental decisions not to mobilize additional IDF units on 5-6 October 1973, and not to strike pre-emptively on 6 October 1973. This latter decision was taken unilaterally by Mrs. Meir, against the advice of CoS Elazar.

Viewed in Israel as a disaster or failing (the Hebrew term used is "michdal" meaning omission), the outbreak of war and initial Israeli setbacks severely damaged the ability of this group to function as an exlusive policy-making body. During the 1973 war, the full Cabinet and General Staff played an increasing role in policy formulation. In the months following the cessation of hostilities, Meir and her colleagues Galili and Dayan, as well as CoS Elazar came under increasing criticism from a broad range of groups within the Israeli public over pre-war decisions, conduct of the war, and subsequent actions.

In the national turmoil that characterized Israel during the months following the 1973 war, including official investigations, national elections, and Mrs. Meir's almost continual illness, few formal changes were implemented in the policy-making process. Indeed, decision-making took on an ad hoc character, being done on a day-to-day basis, much of

it by key staff members such as Mordechai Gazit (Director General of the Prime Minister's Bureau), with virtually no long-range policy planning being done at all.

Immediate priority was given to the rebuilding of the IDF to meet the possibility of renewed full-scale fighting and to securing a disengagement of forces on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. To the extent settlement policies of an interim nature were required for these ends, they were formulated by the established political and military leadership. With regard to the general decision-making environment following the 1973 war it is possible to conclude:

(a) The full Cabinet and Knesset were no longer willing to tolerate a small, exclusive decision-making body immune to influence on key defense, security and settlement issues;

(b) The public at large, and particularly key groups within the Israeli public, were no longer willing to permit policy-making on an exclusive basis;

(c) A wide range of key publics modified their own policy positions to ones differing from both their own pre-war positions and established Government positions;

(d) Key publics sought and established increasing influence over policy-making.

Thus, it is possible to say that there is, as a result of the 1973 war and its aftermath, a set of motivated key publics seeking to influence the making of Israeli defense, security and settlement policy. The relationship of these groups to actual policy-making is, however, still

amorphous and their efficacy unclear. Based on events such as the 1973
elections, the resignation of the Meir Government, formation of the Rabin
Government, disengagement talks and other evidence, however, it is possible
to assume that influence by such key groups will be significant for
the forseeable future.

Criteria for Selection of Key Publics

While it is clear that a number of segments within Israeli
society are relatively cohesive, homogeneous groups and exert influence
over policy-making, defining a set of specific criteria to be used in
identifying these as key publics is difficult. As a practical matter,
this task is more readily accomplished through a two stage process of
looking at what groups have emerged as effective, and secondly at which
groups are perceived to be effective by the political and military
leadership.

The first step is to consider the range of groups which have
emerged over the years, based on demographic, religious, cultural, poli-
tical, economic, educational, and other factors.[8] Second, it is possible
to narrow the list to those groups which have been able to gain national
recognition or are for other reasons perceived by the political and
military decision-makers as being influential.[9]

Religious Groups: Central sub-populations are Israel's Jewish,
Arab, and Christian communities, although both Israeli Arabs and Chris-
tians lack significant influence, as such, and Israel's Orthodox Jewry
is most directly represented through the National Religious Party (NRP).

Cultural Groups: The principal division here is between Israel's Jews of European origin (Ashkenazim), and those of Eastern or Oriental origin (Sephardim). While the former are best considered in terms of the other publics to which they belong, the Sephardim have acquired the status of being Israel's "minority group" and have begun to seek recognition and influence as such.[10] With the possible exception of Israel's short-lived "Black Panther Party", this group has thus far failed to establish itself as an effective public in strategic policy-making.

While such a vacuum of influence for this group exists at present, it is important to note the enormous potential for influence in the future. As one analysis points out:

> It is significant that the government officials most intimately seized with the problem and most knowledgeable about it are the ones most worried about the malign potential of the Orientals. . . Equally, they are the ones most concerned lest unawareness among the Europeans of the Oriental resentment could inhibit the fundamental changes in priorities. . .

> Surprisingly, in view of the fertile field that would seem to exist, there has been very little demagoguery by Oriental political aspirants trying to exploit the imbalance for electoral purposes. . . But its absence so far is no guarantee for the future.[11]

Economic Groups: For the most part, economic divisions within Israeli society are coincident with other common factors. The most important of these divisions are the religious and cultural differences already considered, and the political schisms considered below. To the extent that it represents Israel's workers, the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) could be examined separately, but it is generally viewed as

an associational group rather than an economic one.

One highly effective public that does have an economic base are the members of Israel's kibbutzim (collective farms). Since the beginning of the State, kibbutz members have formed the backbone of the Israeli military (IDF) and have held a disproportionately large share of top military and political posts.[12] As many kibbutzim are border settlements and have provided Israel's first line of defense, the interests of this public are vitally linked with Israel's defense, security and settlement policies.

Institutional Groups: Here, three basic publics suggest themselves: the military (the defense Establishment), world Jewry, and Israel's civil servants. By any set of criteria, the first two of these are key publics and are included in the analysis. The third presents a more difficult problem.

In the past this group, specifically the senior staff of the Foreign Ministry, has been influential in the implementation of policy, if not in its formulation. In this process, there has been a certain amount of interest group advocacy on issues such as recognition of South Africa, relations with the People's Republic of China in 1954-5, and Israel's decision to vote against a U.S. sponsored resolution on Arab refugees at the U.N. in 1965.

Associational Groups: Selecting from the myriad of interest groups in this category which do, or may exert influence over strategic policy-making is no small task. Major groups, such as the Histadrut, the Israel Manufacturers' Association, and the kibbutz organizations

are well established and obvious candidates. Of these, only the
Histadrut and kibbutz organizations have been selected for more
detailed analysis.

A different problem is posed by a public led by a number of
academics and intellectuals who have been persistent advocates of
accomodation-centered policy and alternative approaches to the Arab
states. While this public has traditionally had some following, no
integrated interest group has emerged to represent this public.
A number of varied groups, including the New Outlook (actually an
English language monthly journal), the Ha'olam Hazeh- Ko'ah Hadash
(New Force) and most recently Ya'ad (Goal) political parties have
attempted to provide opinion leadership with limited success.

As the ranks of this accommodation-centered public have swelled
in the aftermath of the 1973 war, this group has become a more potent
force, although no single interest group or political party has yet
emerged to fully utilize its thrust. This remains as one of the major
centrifugal forces within Israeli society today. The traditionally
leftist political parties, which would be expected to represent such
sentiment, have failed to do so. With the continued inability of the
Government to bring about a political settlement, the probability that
this latent force will ultimately exert itself in some form increases.

Non-Associational Groups: In lieu of specific interest groups
to represent the academic-intellectual community, it will be included
in the analysis as a "non-associational" group. Another group which
could be considered here are Israel's journalists and commentators

(the media). In as much as the media generally reflect the positions of specific parties and other organizations, they will be considered in relation to the groups they represent.

Political Parties: One of the most useful ways to analyze a democratic nation in terms of key publics is through its political parties, which often reflect the range of issue positions within the larger society. To a large extent this is true in Israel as well, although, none of the major parties as yet fully represent the growing segment of accommodation-centered opinion.

Central to any consideration of Israeli policy is an analysis of the Mapai (Israel Labor Party), which has dominated every government and coalition since 1948, and whose policy has been the Government policy. During this time it has controlled the key portfolios concerned with defense, security, and settlement policy (Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Foreign Minister) and most major policy decisions have originiated within the Mapai. Since the 1973 war, however, it is not altogether clear that the Mapai still represents accurately the views of those it claims to represent. Nevertheless, Mapai, and especially its Cabinet members, is still the essential group to be influenced.

In terms of alternative orientations toward the issues of defense, security, and settlement policy, the other parties fall into several major categories representing the principal divisions within the electorate. Because of the tendency of Israeli parties to split, merge and change names over time, it is useful to look at the voters and the

party system in terms of basic policy orientations.

The first major category over time has been the "ideological left", including such parties as Mapam, Ahdut Ha'avodah, Moked and most recently Ya'ad. What is significant to note about the ideological left, where support for accommodation-centered policy would otherwise be expected, is the domination of the left by groups such as the kibbutzim with force-centered beliefs. This has almost eliminated advocacy of accomodation-centered security and settlement policies. Further, the foreign policies advocated by the left over time have been inconsistent.[13]

A second category includes the "nationalist right", such as the perennial opposition Herut (Freedom) party, its splinters and successors. While the fundamental differences between it and the Mapai have been over domestic and economic issues, the right has advocated policies stressing greater force and less accommodation than Mapai.[14] During the 1967-70 period, however, when the right joined in the National Unity Government, its policy was essentially the same as that of Mapai. Following dissolution of the unity government in 1970, and more importantly since the 1973 war, the policy of the right and allied groups has become more force-centered than Mapai, although no genuine alternative has been put forth.

A third category can be referred to as the "pragmatist" parties, for lack of a better term, including parties such as the Liberals and Rafi, located ideologically between the left and right. At present the former is aligned with the right in the Likud bloc and the latter the Mapai, although both serve a key pivotal role in coalition formation

and policy-making.

Fourth is a group of "religious" parties including Israel's National Religious Party (NRP) and related splinter parties which have served a pivotal role in decision-making since 1967. Prior to this time they acquiesced to the Government in virtually all matters of defense and foreign policy, placing their trust in Ben-Gurion's judgment. Representing a substantial segment of Israel's Orthodox Jews, this group has been highly influential in domestic policy since 1948. Beginning in the May 1967 crisis, and again following the 1973 war, the religious parties began to exert a force-centered influence.

A fifth and final group of "minor" parties can be considered, as each of them generally represents some particular segment of the Israeli population. However, none of these minor factions is in a position to exert substantial influence in the making of strategic policy.

Assumptions of the Analysis

At this point, it is necessary to state the primary assumptions upon which the present analysis is based. Due to real world factors such as imperfect and costly transfer of information, confusion, uncertainty, and human error, such assumptions are, of course, ideal statements about the way people behave, individually and collectively, but are a close enough approximation to be useful.

The fundamental analytical assumption is that of a decision and policy-making process based on rational choice.[15] First, it is assumed that individuals in society:

(a) Pay the most attention to those issues they perceive as most important to themselves and the society;

(b) Select as their position those policies that they feel best meet their interests, based on the information they have;

(c) Join, vote for, or otherwise support those groups and representatives which advocate policies most closely related to their own.

In the present analysis, we are assuming that virtually all individuals (decision-makers and general population) in Israel now perceive the defense, security and settlement issues as extremely important to themselves and the state, and have definite policy preferences in this area.

Second, with regard to Israeli interest groups, associations, parties and other key publics we assume:

(a) Such publics represent sub-populations with similar policy preferences over salient issues;

(b) The policy positions of presumed representatives of a key public are the positions of that public as the representatives perceive them.

(c) The key public and its representatives do or attempt to exert influence over the formulation of actual Government policy.

Further, we make the assumption that for virtually all decision-makers in a democracy, such as Israel, the desire to remain in office and bring about a situation of security and peace constitutes the best interest of the decision-maker. Thus, we set aside the problem of

exactly how policy-makers perceive their nation's best interest.[16]

A final assumption introduces the dynamic element in policy advo-
cacy. Namely, that ongoing events such as the 1973 war, disengagement
negotiations, and other actions are assumed to have an impact on the
key publics and their representatives causing a continuing reassess-
ment and evaluation of basic policy positions and modification of
existing policies when warranted.

The Analytical Framework

Given the assumptions stated above, the organization of the
analysis is summarized in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 illustrates a
number of the "key publics" considered in terms of sub-populations
of Israeli society (Column 1); the institutional groups which represent
the key public (Column 2); and the policy-makers, if any, which may
share or be influenced by the group's policy positions (Column 3).
The last two columns relate the groups to outcomes of the policy-
making process. Here (Column 4) indicates the actual policies formu-
lated and adopted and the last (Column 5) simply notes the final step,
that is, the outcomes which result from the interaction of policies
selected by Israel's decision-makers and those of the other actors in
the system.

Figure 2 presents a more detailed view of the manner in which a
given key public formulates its policy, communicates with its repre-
sentatives, exerts influence over policy-makers, and evaluates its
policy in light of a variety of factors. The boxes in the first

FIGURE 1

IDENTIFICATION OF KEY PUBLICS & THE FORMULATION OF POLICIES

(1) EFFECTIVE (KEY) PUBLICS (Population)	(2) INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS (Representation)	(3) EXPLICIT POLICY MAKERS	(4) DEFENSE/ SECURITY POLICIES	(5) CONTINGENT OUTCOMES
Israeli Military	IDF Leadership	IDF Gen. Staff	Defense/ Security Policy	Interaction with other concerned actors
Organized Labor	Histadrut (Gen. Fed. of Labor)	Histadrut/ Sec. General		
Voters	Political Parties	Prime Minister other ministers Cabinet/MCSD	Foreign Policy	
Orthodox Jewry	Nat. Religious Party Orthodox Rabinate	Minister of Religious Affairs	Settlement Policy	
World Jewry (outside Israel)	KKL, UJA, AJC, WIZO, Hadassah, etc.			
Academics and Intellectuals	Media Political Parties Academic Associations			
Israeli Arabs (pre-1967)	Arab Political Parties	Arab Coalition Members		

FIGURE 2

POLICY FORMULATION, MODIFICATION AND INFLUENCE

POLICY ORIGIN	BASIC POLICY OF KEY PUBLIC	INFLUENCE & AGGREGATION	FORMULATED GOV'T POLICY	CONTINGENT OUTCOMES

Other Actors
1. Arab states
2. U.S.
3. U.S.S.R.
4. U.N./Europe

CONTINGENT OUTCOMES

INPUTS OF OTHER KEY PUBLICS

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POLICY

MODE OF INFLUENCE (Explicit)

BASIC POLICY
1. Salience
2. Flexibility
3. Parameters
4. Perception of change

Δ_2

KEY PUBLIC

Δ_1

INTERNATIONAL EVENTS (e.g. 1973 war)

PRIOR POLICIES & OUTCOMES

Note on Perceptual Prisms

Δ_1 - Perceptual prism + change in preferences over time.

Δ_2 - Perceptual prism + time lag problem

column concern the formation of a basic policy from the group's perception
(through a perceptual "Filter" Δ_1) of prior international events,
resulting from prior policies and outcomes. Essential to the character
of this perceptual prism (Δ_1) are the following elements:

(a) Israel is a Jewish state whose survival is to be maintained
at all costs;

(b) Israel is dependent on the United States for military aid,
economic assistance and diplomatic support;

(c) The combined voting strength of the Arab, Soviet and non-
aligned bloc has made the passage of any pro-Israel resolu-
tion in the United Nations impossible;

(d) Israel is totally isolated within the Middle East region,
and the geographic situation poses a continuing challenge
to security in the absence of a permanent peace settlement;

(e) Israel is vastly outnumbered and outfinanced by the Arab
states, creating a continuous demand for new immigrants to
augment her military and economic manpower;

(f) Coalition government is a fixed element of the Israel
political system, limiting the flexibility of strategic
policy-making.

The second perceptual prism (Δ_2) contains the filters that
structure the way in which basic policy reflects the preferences of
key publics. The same elements considered above are central here as
well, with the additional factor of a time lag in the modification of
basic policy vis-a-vis reaction to new events and information.

Following on the formation of the group's basic policy is a mode of influence through which the group can exert influence over official government policy. Combined with this are the inputs from other key publics as well as the policy preferences and perceptions of the actual decision-makers. Once a policy is formulated, the actions of the Government in its implementation as well as the actions of other relevant actors determine outcomes. These outcomes and their consequences provide feedback to the key public.

1.2 THE KEY PUBLICS, THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AND POLICIES

The Israeli Military

Obtaining hard data on the extent to which the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) and its top leadership are effective in influencing
policy-making is difficult because of the secrecy surrounding the IDF
and the fundamental postulate of "civilian" rule in Israel. Indeed,
many authorities have consistently denied the status of interest group
to the IDF, relegating it to a subordinate role in the policy-making
process.[17]

As late as 1965 Gen. Yehoshofet Harkabi, one of the leading
authorities on strategic matters in Israel, denied such influence
existed, but has since revised his views.[18] He noted at the time that
officers belonged to different political parties, that policy divisions
appeared among many of the staff, and that there existed a lack of "clearly
defined views" on major foreign policy questions. Overriding all of this,
however, has been the belief generally shared in the IDF that Israel's
security position is of paramount importance and all other policy
decisions must be evaluated in this light.

One example of this has been the advocacy by Moshe Dayan, from 1955
on, of a force-centered policy of retaliation. Backed by the General
Staff, this policy was advocated by Dayan (then Chief of Staff) and
made official policy by Ben-Gurion. Here we have a clear link between
IDF policy advocacy, formulation by the Government, and implementation
vis-a-vis the Arab states.

Similar examples are found in the November 1956 decision to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza, which the IDF was unable to prevent, and more importantly in May 1967, when alarmed members of the General Staff (led by then Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin) demanded the immediate adoption and implementation of a force-centered policy and the launching of a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and Syria.[19]

In general, the military has been described by one authority as "a permanent arms lobby" promoting the acquisition of weapons for Israel's security over all other considerations.[20] On this basis the IDF encouraged an alliance with France in 1954-55 and closer ties with the U.S. following the 1967 war.

The basic policy position of the IDF can be viewed as force-centered, seeking to provide for the security of the State through an adequate supply of arms and the utilization of force to best advantage given the perceived numerical imbalance in the strategic situation. In the past this policy has included retaliation in force, and the use of "interceptive" or pre-emptive warfare on the Arab states.

In the 1956 and 1967 wars, the IDF sought to establish a policy of "decisive victories," a policy which the IDF feels was not followed in the 1973 war. In any future conflicts it is unlikely that IDF advocacy of pre-emption and decisive termination will again be taken lightly.

Finally, security considerations have always predominated over settlement in considerations. In part this stems from a widespread belief that the Arabs will never settle the broader conflict, and that any territory given back under interim arrangements will have to be

retaken at high cost in an inevitable renewed round of fighting.

Orthodox Jewry

The role of Israel's Orthodox Jews in the formulation of strategic policy has often been misunderstood, both within and outside Israel. Here an initial problem stems from an old division which existed in the Orthodox community over the use of force, and the refusal of some orthodox Jews to fight in the IDF. Convinced that "Zion" could be established only by divine action, the "Agudah" faction opposed all force-centered policies for many years.

A second problem arises from the apparent approval of all defense and security policies that were promulgated by the Government up to May 1967. The interpretation given this acquiesence was that the defense and security issues were simply not salient to this public, and that as long as they were allowed to influence domestic policy in religious and related areas, their support for established defense policy could be taken for granted. Such an interpretation is inaccurate, as subsequent events have demonstrated.

From 1948 through May 1967 the religious community had placed its trust in essentially one man -- David Ben-Gurion -- and believed that his policies were the best for the State. From Ben-Gurion's "retirement" in 1963 to May 1967, in the absence of imminent war, this support continued and became institutionalized in support of the Eshkol Government. When the crisis of May 1967 arose, however, Eshkol lost Ben-Gurion's support over the initial decision to go to war.

Since 1967, the religious groups represented by the NRP have
advocated defense and security policies more force-centered than the
Mapai and have been far closer to the pragmatist center and rightest
parties.

Looking at the development of settlement policy, a marked trend
toward less accommodation can be observed. In the 1955 NRP election
platform, for example, only a brief and vague statement appeared urging
"continued efforts to achieve support at the UN. . . consideration for
any reasonable peace plan." Implicitly, the NRP was willing to accept
the 1948 Armistice lines as final boundaries and possibly the 1947
partition lines.[21]

By 1959, NRP policy was still the same as _Mapai_'s, stressing
"peace, based on recognition of Israel's sovereignty."[22] By 1965
the group was still encouraging "friendly relations with all peoples",
but it encouraged elimination of political considerations from the
military, especially after the 1973 war. One religious faction advanced
a solution to the Arab refugee problem based on their settlement outside
Israel, with compensation, and unification of families only on the basis
of peace negotiations. In short, by 1965, the religious block had begun
to take a harder and less accommodating line toward the Arabs and settle-
ment issues.

Victory in the 1967 war, particularly the recapture of Jerusalem's
holy places and the West Bank territories from Jordan, brought a new
impetus to the demands of the religious. The group's policy now included
a refusal to return or even negotiate over Jerusalem's holy places, and

an insistence that Israel retain the West Bank areas of Judea and Samaria, which the NRP regards as part of the biblical Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel).

In sum, the policy of Orthodox Jewry as a key public has been most directly reflected in Israel's religious parties. Originally represented by two pairs of parties (split on socialist/non-socialist and earlier force/no-force issues), they are now represented by the National Religious Party (NRP), and the smaller Agudat Yisrael (Religious Front) party. As continuous members of every Government since 1948,[23] the NRP has had direct influence on policy-making both in the Cabinet and on the MCSD.

Economic Groups

Since the major ideological divisions are represented in the political parties, and since it was the hope of Israel's founders to create an economically homogeneous society, the effective publics that usually emerge as important in smaller nations are absent here, with two notable exceptions.

First of these exceptions is Israel's organized labor represented by the Histadrut, Israel's semi-official General Federation of Labor. In addition to its representational function as a union, the Histadrut serves a variety of other functions, including administering the national health service (Kupat Cholim), assisting with immigration problems, and organizing world Jewry through its affiliates. More importantly, the Histadrut forms the broad power base of the ruling Mapai (Israel Labor Party).

.It is through this relationship that organized labor is able to influence policy-making, and in turn the Histadrut is used by the Government for the promulgation of its policies. In 1956 and 1967, for example, the Histadrut rallied its trade union in support of free passage for Israeli ships and cargo through the Suez Canal.

However, the major thrust of the Histadrut's efforts is in the area of domestic economic policy. To the extent the group holds views on defense and settlement issues, it is fairly well represented in the Mapai. Thus, its primary functions are implementation and communication of Israeli policy to other nations of the Western world. It has long been the opinion of Israel's labor/socialist leadership that the state must seek support from and solidarity with other socialist nations, and has utilized the Histadrut to this end, although with only qualified success.

Far smaller than the Histadrut, but still important in the formulation of policy is the key public composed of Israel's kibbutz members. Running through this group are the dual ideals of nationalism and socialism, and a situation which places many of them, living on the frontier, at the crux of the defense, security and settlement problems. Despite this pivotal position, the kibbutz movement has generally sought to exert influence through established political parties, namely Ahdut Ha'avodah and Mapai.

Institutional Groups

Of the major institutional groups mentioned the military has already been treated separately. The next of these publics is one unique to Israel, namely the major externally-based public of world

Jewry. While not formally a sub-group of Israel's domestic population, it is included in the analysis in view of the leverage and influence exerted by Jews living outside Israel.

First, world Jewry acts as both a positive pressure on Israel's leaders and as a restraint on policy. Second, in the implementation of policy, it serves much the same role as that of the Histadrut, i.e. bringing Israel's message to other nations and mobilizing international support for Israeli policy. Further, world Jewry provides funds for military and development purposes and has been able to bring some pressure on major powers such as the United States and France to supply Israel with needed weapons.[24]

The two major blocs of world Jewry outside Israel are in North America and the Soviet Union. As the latter is powerless to express its opinions or influence Israeli policy, it is not considered. North American Jewry, and particularly the Jewish community in the United States, has taken an active interest in advocating policy. While much of this is concerned with non-defense matters, some is relevant to the security/settlement area.

From pre-State times through 1956, American Jewry pressed Israel for an accommodation-centered line of greater conciliation and cooperation with the Arab states. In brief, it supported Moshe Sharett's "soft" line and sought to use the U.N. as a means to achieve permanent settlement -- an organization Ben-Gurion viewed with considerable disdain.[25]

Another element of policy advocated by American Jewry stems from a dislike of Israel's reprisal policy. Beginning with the Kibya raid

in October 1953, the Lake Kinneret raid in 1955, and throughout the 1960's it continually pressed the Israeli leadership for caution and a limitation of raids, which were seen as undermining Israel's position as a legitimate and peace seeking power. These exhortations fell on deaf ears, as a luxury that could be afforded by Jews thousands of miles from Arab guns, but not for an Israel struggling for survival.

Likewise, dissent arose from America over Israel's Sinai conquest of 1956. In addition to pressure from President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, this urging by Nahum Goldmann led to Ben-Gurion's acceptance, in principle, of Israeli withdrawal on 8 November 1956:

> Goldmann informed Ben-Gurion that American Jewry had been most happy about the Sinai victory but would not stand behind Israel if she persisted in keeping the conquered territory. He added that collections to the national Jewish funds might be forbidden.[26]

A similar policy was advocated following the 1967 war, although in a far more subdued tone. American Jews urged Israeli concessions and entry into indirect talks with the Arab states. Speaking for American Jewry, Nahum Goldmann has espoused this soft line, which is at sharp variance with established Israeli policy.[27] Goldmann has even suggested Israel's eventual integration into a Middle East Confederation of equal states. In the spring of 1970 he advocated an immediate return to the 4 June 1967 borders and the right of Arab refugees to return to their lost homes. To many, these views went past accommodation and looked toward the dismantling of the Jewish state.

It is likely that Goldmann's views do not represent a consensus of

the American Jewish community, if indeed there is a consensus, but he has been the most vociferous in attempting to influence Israeli policy in the name of American Jewry. If anything, the policy of American Jewry contains two basic elements:

(a) The view that the United States has an obligation to supply Israel with arms to defend itself from the Arabs;

(b) A belief in accommodation rather than force vis-a-vis settlement issues, reflecting a growing feeling that additional wars are pointless and a settlement can only be accomplished through conciliation.

To these ends, American Jews are willing to exert all possible influence on United States policy-makers on Israel's behalf.

The mechanism through which world Jewry attempts to exert influence is the World Zionist Organization, and several institutional adjuncts. As important is the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Founded in 1890 in New York, the AJC began as anti-Zionist, becoming at best ambivalently non-Zionist following the Second World War. Since 1948, the AJC has supported Israel's basic right to exist, but has consistently pushed for full and equal rights for Israel's Arabs, conciliation toward the Arab states, and the elimination of what it sees as "military government" in Israel.[28]

The WZO and AJC have been able to exercise direct influence in the policy-making process for several reasons, including:

(a) A fundamental belief by Israel's founders that links with "Diaspora" (exile) Jewry are essential to the survival and development of the State;

(b) The stream of new immigrants and financial support provided by the American Jewish Community, and the implicit "threat" of eliminating such support;

(c) The perceived need (by Israeli leaders) for American Jews to influence their own Government in the provision of economic and military aid to Israel;

(d) The direct personal influence of American leaders such as Nahum Goldmann and the AJC's Jacob Blaustein over Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, and Meir.

Nevertheless, Israel has gone its own way in many policy matters, despite dissent from the rest of world Jewry. This is clear in cases such as efforts to establish a U.N. military presence on Israeli territory, where mitigating efforts by the American Jewish community were fruitless.

The second important institutional group is Israel's civil servants, particularly those in the areas of strategic and settlement policy. Excluding the civilian staff of the Defense Ministry, we are left with the staff of Israel's Foreign Ministry. This is a natural group to be concerned with strategic and settlement issues, and at first glance would appear to have substantial means with which to exert influence. The extent to which it has, in recent years, been able to exert influence is, however, a far more serious question.

In general, the policy positions of senior civil servants of Israel's Foreign Ministry have been more accommodation-centered than official Government policy and the military.

For example, over the years this group has pressed for the recognition of South Africa and establishment of diplomatic relations with the Peoples' Republic of China in 1954-55. The limits of this accommodation can be seen in its support for Israel's vote against a U.S.-sponsored resolution on Arab refugees at the 1965 General Assembly, preferring an overall agreement among the states concerned. There is some evidence, however, that this decision was heavily colored by Foreign Minister Meir's personal feelings on the matter.

Under Foreign Minister Eban, who himself believed in accommodation-centered modes of action, the senior staff moved further in this direction. Since this group implements the official Government policy, it is difficult to find evidence of the policy positions and beliefs which it advocates to policy-makers. Based on personal interviews, and other non-attributable sources, it is possible to outline this basic policy as:

(a) Accommodation and conciliation toward the Arab states, based on withdrawal of Israeli forces (possibly to the 4 June 1967 lines);

(b) Direct negotiation with all of the Arab states involved in the conflict;

(c) Modification of established Government policy with respect to "occupied" territories, namely that following an Israeli withdrawal the future of these areas is an internal Arab matter, not to be settled by Israel (i.e. de facto recognition of a Palestinian entity).

· The obvious mode of influence for this group is through its own
Minister, although such direct influence has not been so clear in recent
years. While Eban held accommodation-centered views of his own, there
is evidence to suggest he simply refused to consider the views and posi-
tions of his senior staff. Before the 1973 war, for example, their
efforts to influence Eban in strategic and settlement matters were
fruitless.

On a second level, Eban himself had almost no influence over the
making of policy before the 1973 war. His accommodation-centered views
were not in keeping with those of Mrs. Meir and her associates, and
Eban was generally not included in the "Kitchen Cabinet". After the
1973 war, Eban did assume more of a decision-making role. However, we
are left with the situation that the senior staff of Israel's Foreign
Ministry had little influence over their Minister, and he in turn little
impact on policy-making.

The situation has changed somewhat with the new Foreign Minister,
Yigal Allon. Although from a military background (unlike Eban), Allon's
views have been more accommodation-oriented than his associates in the
Cabinet. It is still clear that the staff of the Ministry is unable to
exert much more influence over Allon than over Eban, although Allon has
attempted to give them a broader role in policy planning.

Associational Groups

The two major associational groups, the Histadrut and the kibbutzim,
have already been considered. What remains is a less well-defined

public consisting largely of academics and intellectuals who have consistently advocated accommodation-oriented policies.

Rather than a basic policy position, this group holds a range of views running from abandonment of Israel as a secular Jewish state to accommodation with the Arab states. The main problems in defining the position of this growing public stem from the often differing views of its members and the fact that no major organization has yet emerged to integrate it or been recognized as its "legitimate" representative.

One surrogate is found in the English language monthly journal New Outlook, founded after the 1956 Sinai Campaign by leading academics and intellecutals interest in accommodation with the Arab states. In the words of its editors:

> Our fundamental assumption and constantly reiterated argument is that the State of Israel is a fact and an inseparable part of the Middle East -- both geographically and politically. . .

> The aspiration(of this group) has been to seek. . . an agreement between the liberation movement of the Jewish people returning to its homeland and building its state and the liberation movements of the Arab peoples.[29]

This journal has consistently promoted a high level of dialogue on critical strategic and settlement issues, with the editors taking accommodation-centered positions in almost every case. Particularly strong has been the advocacy of return of occupied territories as a basis for a political settlement and elimination of the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East through Israel's signing of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Neither of these has been accepted

as Government policy.

In addition to its direct impact on the public as a whole, the group has some link to policy-making through the leftist Mapam party. New Outlook's most influential writer, Simha Flapan, has served as Director of Mapam's Arab Department. Flapan's own rejection of force-centered policy can be seen in the following:

> Armaments have become a substitute for foreign policy and instead of being a means of defense have become an end in themselves, to which all other aspects must be subservient. This is the fundamental error of Mr. Peres' approach (and that of the Mapai Establishment), and from that fallacy he goes on from error to error. . . in order to make reality fit his theory.[30]

In its history, New Outlook and its sponsors have organized a series of meetings on topics relevant to security policy, which have brought together leading academics and intellectuals from around the world. Many of these, led by Martin Buber, were impressive gatherings, but had scarce impact on actual policy-making, despite Flapan's claims that they were responsible for "important relaxations in the Military Administration (and) a considerable advance in many fields of Jewish-Arab relations. . ."[31] Actually, the journal's influence is greater outside Israel, among accommodation-oriented Jews already receptive to this line.

Despite the growing popularity of accommodation-centered policy since the 1973 war, the impact of this group has not grown. A major reason for this may be the strong leftist ideology associated with New Outlook writers and their Mapam colleagues. If anything, the 1973

Knesset elections demonstrate an electoral shift to the right.[32] Thus, while a growing segment of the Israeli population is willing to support an accommodation-centered security and settlement policy, they are unwilling to use this as a basis for supporting leftist organizations and parties.

Another center of the academic-intellectual community that advocated accommodation-oriented policy in the pre-1973 war period was the Ha'olam Hazeh political movement, founded in 1965 by Uri Avneri, publisher of a weekly of the same name. Combining policy statements with gossip, scandal and sex stories, the readership of the weekly and Avneri's following grew substantially, with the party (Avneri) winning one seat in the sixth Knesset, two in the seventh (1969), but none in the eighth (1973).

The failure of genuine support to materialize for this group stems not so much from its accomodation-oriented line, which has been similar to that of Mapam, but rather from its position which called for non-identification with either of the major powers, at a time when Israel was becoming increasingly dependent on the United States. Further, Avneri and his colleagues unrealistically urged Israel's identification with the "third world" nations, which by this time were turning against Israel in increasing numbers.

Following the 1967 war, this group advocated a federation of Israel and "Palestine", supporting the right of Palestinian Arab refugees to return to their homes. Here Avneri and his followers began to move away from the mainstream of most accommodation-centered

groups in Israel. After the 1973 war, a shift toward Avneri's position took place in a substantial segment of the population, but the movement failed to attract any real support.

One recent attempt at forming an accommodation oriented coalition includes elements of the Mapai, under Arieh ("Lova") Eliav, the Civil Rights Party, and former supporters of Avneri and previous peace movements.

We conclude, with regard to these accommodation oriented groups, that their influence on actual policy-making has been marginal at best, and is unlikely to increase substantially in the future.

Non-Associational Groups

Israel contains a multitude of non-associational interest groups, each with a small following. Here, the policies put forth by such groups on defense and settlement issues range from annexation of all occupied territories to abandonment of the Jewish state. None of these fringe groups has had, or is likely to have, any significant influence on policy-making, even though, due to the nature of Israel's electoral system, such groups have from time to time gained a few Knesset seats.

More important here are Israel's academics and members of the media. While the academics have had virtually no influence as a group, it is not possible to conclude that individual academics have been without influence. Indeed, Israel's university personnel have traditionally been politically active. A number of them have joined in party policy debates, and several have served in the Knesset.[34]

National "crises" and the problems associated with the 1973 war have been particularly effective in arousing academic interest in security policy. Noted above was the involvement of some academics through New Outlook, but it is important to note that association with this journal is not indicative of the bounds of this key public. In 1962, for example, a group of academics urged "the Israeli public to act while there is still time against this terrible eventuality (use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East)" and presented the following three demands:

(1) That the Middle Eastern nations refrain from military nuclear production by mutual agreement, if possible;

(2) U.N. supervision be instituted in the region to prevent military nuclear production;

(3) The middle Eastern nations refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons from the major powers.[35]

This interest was related in part to the worldwide "ban the bomb" sentiment that was popular among academics at the time, but the concern has persisted.[36]

Following the 1967 war, this group expressed its views on the security and settlement isssues, taking an accommodation-centered line that is often referred to as the "Buberist" (after Martin Buber) spirit of concessions. These views were represented by non-associational groups such as the Movement for Peace and Security and the Land of Israel Movement. Such views, critical of official Israeli policy, were expressed in a symposium sponsored in April 1970 by Newsweek magazine.[37]

The media in Israel are best viewed as an extension of the multi-

party political system. This view is complicated, however, by the
special relationships that exist between a number of Israel's leading
journalists and members of the military and political leadership. In
a number of circumstances, such as the May 1967 crisis, members of the
media have acted as an effective public and served to exert considerable
influence on policy-makers.[38]

Representing the range of party opinions, as well as several
independents, Israel's newspapers have no common position which they
advocate. Opinion is most commonly led by Israel's highly respected
and influential Ha'aretz, Ma'ariv and, to a lesser extent, the English-
language Jerusalem Post. Ha'aretz enjoys "New York Times" status and
a reputation for high quality journalism, while both Ma'ariv and
Ha'aretz have exceptional access to policy-makers and information.

While none of these papers have individual writers of towering
national esteem, a number of them have military and political leader-
ship backgrounds and write from an informed position of authority.
In turn they are taken with seriousness and share the confidence of
their former associates and colleagues. A number maintain close
personal relationships with Israel's leaders as well.

Political Parties

Israel's numerous political parties have over the years fairly
well reflected the policy divisions that existed within the larger
society.. To a considerable extent Israel's party list electoral system
and the fact that no party has ever won a clear majority of Knesset seats,

supports this view, although parties have often adjusted their positions on joining the coalition.

Against this view is the fact that over the years the population of Israel has undergone an enormous change, in size, composition and policy positions yet the parties have tended to remain constant, in both their proportion of Knesset seats won and basic policy positions. Further, for the most part, the same personalities have dominated the parties since statehood (1948). This latter factor has in itself been the source of a great deal of tension in Israeli society since the 1973 war, and gives support to the charge that Israel's parties no longer represent the center of opinion of their followers. Here, in order to delineate these factors, each party is considered in turn.

Mapai: The ideological center from which other party policies must be evaluated is the position (actually a range of opinion) of the ruling Mapai (Israel Labor Party). Since Mapai, and more recently with its partners in the Ma'arach (Alignment bloc), has led every coalition since 1948, its position has been official Government policy. Traditionally major policy positions have been worked out within the Mapai Central Committee rather than in government meetings or other inter-party processes. In crisis situations it has been Mapai's members of the Cabinet, holding the key Prime Minister's, Defense, and Foreign Minister's portfolios who have made decisions. Finally, when new leadership was demanded after the 1973 war, these new leaders were selected by vote of the Mapai Central Committee. Thus, this committee

is a source of direct influence over policy-making in all issue areas.

Over the years the basic position of the Mapai has shifted in
the force-centered direction, reflecting both the personal views of
its leadership and pressure from its factions (most importantly the
Ahdut Ha'avodah) to increase military preparedness and protect
border settlements. A number of the disputes which have separated the
Mapai from its coalition partners are either unrelated to the defense
and settlement issues or are no longer points of contention. For
example, the debate over alignment with the Soviet Union; and relations
with India and China (PRC).

Thus Mapai policy has been Government policy, with its emphasis
on force, strength, security and pragmatism. Further, the selection
of this policy by Mapai's followers and the nation has not been by
default. Over the years alternative policies and options have
been hotly debated within the party and the electorate as a whole. In
the aftermath of the 1973 war, these policy debates erupted anew, and
if a shift in policy is to come, it is most likely to come from within
the Mapai.

Ahdut Ha'avodah: To the left of Mapai in the Alignment (Ma'arach)
is the nationalist-socialist Ahdut Ha'avodah (Unity of Labor Party).
This group has had a history of merger and splits from both the Mapai
and Mapam sharing the ideological ground between the two. More
important than pure ideological considerations, however, is the key
public which this party represents and the leadership it has produced.

The basic policy position of the party stems directly from the

hard-core of the kibbutz movement. Many kibbutzim have joined the
Ha-Kibbutz Ha-me'uhad (The United Kibbutz) movement which provides the
organizational base and support for Ahdut Ha'avodah. Having no substan-
tial ideological differences with Mapai, the difference was that this
was basically an agrarian oriented group, while Mapai's base of support
has been in Israel's urban areas. The special security problems of
Israel's agricultural settlements, which are often border outposts,
gave rise to differences over defense and security policy. These differences
were reflected in the defense organizations that emerged in pre-State
times and the military and political leadership the movement has
produced.[39] Among the military and political leaders produced in this
movement have been Yisrael Galili, Moshe Carmel and most notably Yigal
Allon.

The policy of Ahdut Ha'avodah has been more force-oriented and
impatient than either Mapai or Mapam. In the past they have opposed
alliance with the United States on the grounds that the U.S. would not
help Israel when needed, and would endanger control over Jordan River
waters. Since October 1973, these considerations have taken on reduced
significance.

More important is the divergence between this group and the Mapai
over security and settlement issues. Ahdut Ha'avodah has traditionally
rejected the concept of a bi-national state contained in the 1947
UN Partition Resolution, and dismissed the possibility of territorial
concessions to the Arabs. Arab refugees were to be rehabilitated on
"unused lands" of the Arab states with international help. In defense,

the party stressed the need for a high degree of military preparedness for subsequent wars they saw as inevitable. The party exerted influence, quite successfully, in the adoption of a force-centered policy of retaliation to stop border incidents.

As a member of the Government, the party's line has been largely merged into that of the Mapai. Thus, the public it represents holds more force-centered beliefs than its representatives. Still, the group represents a relatively small, but highly influential, sub-population of kibbutz members. Also, these are the people who have provided the backbone of the military (IDF), and whose daily lives are at the center of the conflict, many of them living within gunshot of Arab borders. Therefore, any changes in policy will require the support of this key public.

The group's most important representative, (Foreign Minister) Yigal Allon, has personally voiced views that are regarded in Israel as "dovish" or accommodation-centered.[40] Coming from a kibbutz and military background, Allon has the respect of both groups. He is in a key position to play a major role in bringing about a shift in Israeli policy toward a more accommodation-oriented position. With his support, this key public would be more willing to accept and support a modified policy.

Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that, despite Allon's present position, he is the weakest of the top three leaders, and does not enjoy widespread respect either in the general public or within the military and political leadership of which he is a member. To some extent his present position is a function of his non-association

with the "disaster" of the 1973 war and the political necessities of forming a viable Government after that war. In speculating on his present and future influence, this qualification must be kept in mind. As his appointment was more one of political necessity, his subsequent influence on strategic policy must be viewed in this light.

Mapam: To the ideological left of Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avodah has been the Mapam with its core in Russian populism and Marxist Leninism. For many years it advocated Israel's alignment with the Soviet Union, although this position has of necessity been moderated since the 1967 war. Further modification of Mapam's views took place when it joined the Government coalition with Mapai. Mapam's policy derives from the Government, of which it is still a member, and its own position, which has been inconsistent over the years. It has shifted from early support of accommodation and a bi-national (Jewish/Palestinian Arab) state to a force-centered policy in the 1967 war, and back to urging a confederation with Jordan. Since the 1973 war, Mapam members have advocated a more accommodation-centered policy than its Mapai colleagues, sharing a source of support for a conciliatory policy within the Government, and have urged the government to map out its minimal final demands as part of the settlement process.

Communists: The Communist Party of Israel (Maki) belongs to the far left ideologically, but, at best, represents an extremely small and non-influential public. As indicated, Mapam represents the bulk of the Marxist-Leninist sentiment and there is little demand for another party, particularly one which has been consistently hostile to Zionism.

In recent years the communists have split into yet smaller factions; the New Communists (Rakah), an Arab group with four seats, and Moked, a Jewish communist group with one seat. Having no influence, these groups confine their activities to verbally accosting both the Government and opposition in Knesset debate.

Likud: Israel's perennial opposition party of the nationalist right has been the Herut (Freedom) party, the political successor to the pre-State Irgun military movement. In recent years the Herut has allied itself with the Liberal Party (as Gahal) and with the further addition of the small Free Center Party formed the Likud (Unity) bloc. This bloc presented a unified party list in the 1973 elections. Likud supporters are a fairly coherent group, ranging from old-time Herut and Irgun supporters to more youthful advocates of free enterprise and a strong, force-oriented military policy.

The major differences which have existed between Likud and Mapai from 1967 on are over issues of economics. As a member of the unity government from 1967 to 1970, the group modified its irredentist position and few differences on strategic and settlement issues exist. Criticism of Government policy since 1967 has been more a function of the group's status as the "opposition" than a fundamental policy disagreement. Following the 1973 war, Likud's criticism of Government intensified, but in no case beyond a point where the Likud could join in a new unity government, and has recently moved toward full support for government policy.

Its fundamental defense policy orientation has always been a force-

oriented one, and traditional disputes in this area were more personality clashes between Mapai's Ben-Gurion and Herut's Begin than substantive policy differences. Recently, these differences have been reflected by the Mapai members of the General Staff and Likud military, notably Gen. Ariel ("Arik") Sharon, although Sharon now occupies an advisory post in the Prime Minister's office.[40] To the extent that differences do exist, the Likud supports a more active and force-centered policy, stressing yet stronger retaliation and decisive victory in any renewed warfare.

More pronounced are the differences in Likud policy toward settlement issues. Likud's predecessor Herut traditionally stressed the following as a basis for any settlement:

(a.) Israel must maintain its claim to "Trans-Jordan", lest it be forced to withdraw from territory captured from Jordan in future wars. This claim anticipated the capture of the West Bank in the 1967 war;

(b.) Israel should not make a settlement on a formal basis with Jordan, but accept an interim accord not compromising the basic claim;

(c.) With the exception of Jordan and Gaza, peace treaties with the other Arab states were acceptable;

(d.) A policy of "hot pursuit" should be adopted whereby "if they (the Arabs) send marauders across the border, we will pursue them into their own territory and not come back".[41]

(e.) The concept of a bi-national state was rejected, although

Arabs in "acquired" territories were free to become

citizens of Israel.

In short, policy grew out of both defense and security considerations, and a desire on the part of the Herut to establish Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel) roughly along the Biblical lines.

Not included in original policy statements were considerations of Sinai and the Golan Heights. Recent policy statements have been expanded to resist return of Sinai and Golan territory but do not stipulate the annexation of these areas as the basis of a settlement. While the Likud persists in its demand that the West Bank territories of Judea and Samaria be retained, there is evidence of flexibility here as well. Since the formation of Likud, the tone of policy has continued to moderate, with references to the historic boundaries of Eretz Yisrael being dropped, as well as rejection of the idea of repatriation of Arab refugees.

On a broader level, Likud has long supported alliance with the West, emphasizing that the State of Israel is part of the Free World.[42] This view has been tempered with a desire for Israeli military self-sufficiency, now viewed as an impossible goal, concern over the Kissinger missions, and the possibility that Israeli interests will be compromised in the spirit of detente.

The actual influence of Likud in policy-making is limited since it no longer belongs to the Government, but is important for a number of reasons. For example, Likud supporters hold many key military and related

related posts. Second, there has been considerable pressure for the

formation of a new unity government which would bring the Likud back

into the policy-making process. A sharp split of opinion exists within

the present Government over the desirability of such unification, with

Mapam vigorously opposing it along with some elements of Mapai, and

more pragmatic elements such as the Rafi and NRP supporting its inclusion.

More importantly, if a basic shift in Government policy toward

accommodation is to take place it will probably have to be with the

acquiescence of the Likud and its supporters. It will be far easier

for the Government to secure this support, if it brings Likud into

the coalition.

Rafi: Crucial to the formation of any Israeli government, and the

security and settlement issues, is the small but influential Rafi faction.

Formed as a splinter of the Mapai in 1965 by David Ben-Gurion, Moshe

Dayan, and Shimon Peres, Rafi merged back into the Mapai in the crisis

of May 1967, but has retained its identity. Rafi represents the

middle ground between Mapai's center on the one hand, and the Likud and

NRP on the other. With its base in pragmatism rather than ideology,

Rafi has strong support in that segment of the public which looks to a

realistic defense and settlement policy.

As a part of Mapai and the government for all but a brief period,

Rafi's position is close to Mapai's but looks toward peace and security

as primary objectives rather than establishing some historic set of

boundaries or a Zionist state based on specific socialist principles.

Given a viable possibility of peace and security through an accommodation-

oriented policy, Rafi could be persuaded to modify its stand. Further, it has generally taken the position that the vital issues of peace and settlement cannot be readily decided without bringing the Likud into the Government and has supported such inclusion since the 1973 elections.

Because of its key position in the political system and the importance and popularity of its leaders, notably Shimon Peres (now Minister of Defense) and Moshe Dayan, Rafi has direct influence on actual policy-making. It can be expected that Rafi will continue to play a role in changes in the Government's composition, as well as future shifts in defense and settlement policy.

Indicative of the willingness of the Rafi to adopt accommodation-oriented action was Peres' use of the military to prevent various Israeli settlement efforts in the "occupied" West Bank.

National Religious Party (NRP): For many years Israel's religious parties and their supporters were considered in terms of their influence over specific aspects of domestic policy and little else. It was assumed by both the Government, of which they have generally been a member, and the population in general that the salience to them of defense and settlement issues was not high. In the years prior to 1967, this was probably a correct view, as the NRP and its affiliates did not seriously expect the capture of Jerusalem and the West Bank area of Judea and Samaria (places with religious significance).

Pronouncements by the NRP included vague statements such as supporting a "realistic" policy, continued efforts to achieve support at the UN, consideration for "any reasonable peace plan", and strengthening the military(IDF).

It was only with the crisis of May 1967 that the NRP attempted to exert influence over the strategic policy-making process, in the face of what it viewed as an impending disaster. Threats by the NRP to quit the coalition in the midst of the May 1967 crisis forced Prime Minister Eshkol to enlarge his Government, bringing in the opposition (then Gahal), Rafi, and making Rafi's Moshe Dayan Minister of Defense. The NRP's thrust was not toward the capture of territories, but defensive interception of what they (and most of Israel) perceived as an impending Arab invasion.

After the 1967 victory, the policy of NRP shifted to include retention of at least Jerusalem's holy places and the areas of Judea and Samaria on the West Bank. Thus, it moved closer to the Likud position on settlement, though it did so more for religious than defense reasons.

Following the 1973 war, the NRP persisted in its territorial demands and embarked on a program to force the inclusion of Likud in any new government formed after the 1973 elections. Out of conviction that solution of the grave defense and settlement problems required a broad based unity government, the NRP posed an ultimatum to Prime Minister Meir. As a necessary coalition partner, it refused to join a new government unless the government agreed to revise the "Law of the Return" covering citizenship for Jewish immigrants, or it agreed to include the Likud in a unity government.

Mrs. Meir refused to concede either point and was forced to form the first minority government in Israeli history. Hence, the strategy of the NRP, to use the first condition to force the second, was unsuccessful.

For a time it appeared that the NRP would be joined by Rafi in forcing the formation of a national unity government, but increased tension on the Syrian front caused Rafi members to return to the Government. The NRP has itself, returned to the coalition on a tentative basis. However, it is still the belief of the NRP and Rafi that a major policy shift, or implementation of any policy, will require broad-based support which the Government does not now enjoy.

To some extent the position of the NRP is complicated by the views of the sub-groups which comprise it, and the lack of a dynamic leader to draw these elements together and represent the part in policy negotiations. Without such leadership, it will be difficult to determine the limits and flexibility of NRP policy towards a more accommodation-centered policy. Hopefully, the NRP would follow the lead of Rafi and the Likud in supporting any settlement reached.

Minor Parties: The minor parties which emerge from time to time in Israel are more a function of Israel's electoral system than major groups in society. Such parties are more often of interest to political scientists than Israel's political and military leadership, and none is presently in a position to exert significant influence.

Brief mention should, however, be made of the recently formed Ya'ad (Goal) party which combines the small Civil Rights Party, accommodation-oriented elements of the Mapai, former members of Ha'olam Hazah, and others who share this view. On the security and settlement issue, the party has recently put forth the following view:

. . . accepting that a political peace agreement, and not the
keeping of territories, is our chief national aim, to be achieved
by recognizing the sovereignty of the State of Israel and all
countries in the area, and striving toward a solution of the
Israel-Palestinian problem, the focus of the problem, through
mutual recognition.[43]

1.3 MODES AND EXTENT OF INFLUENCE

Military Influence

The role of the military (IDF) in the policy-making process has been a matter of considerable concern in Israel for a number of years. A fundamental precept of the State is that the military be the instrument of strategic and security policy, not its maker. The situation becomes critical in the case of Israel, where defense and settlement policy play such a critical role in the day-to-day life of the nation.

In reality, the distinction is further blurred, as the political leadership must rely heavily on the "military" for vital intelligence, assessments, and ultimate implementation. Further, most of Israel's political leadership shares experiences and close personal associations with the military leadership. For example, Mrs. Meir's decisions prior to the 1973 war demonstrate that these decisions are ultimately political, but other cases, such as Eshkol's change of policy in the May 1967 crisis demonstrate the ability of the military to exert sufficient influence to change policy.

Influence is exerted by the military through formal channels and a number of alternative modes. Given its institutional position, it is required to make a continuous input into the decision-making process. Since requisite inputs in the areas of intelligence, analysis and assessment necessarily include both subjective and objective elements, this process can be considered influence.

The formal channel of policy advocacy has been the weekly meetings of the General Staff (more often when the situation requires), which are usually attended by the Defense Minister. He, in turn, is able to present the views of the military to the Cabinet. Here, it has been the design of Israel's political and military leadership to make the line of communication between military and decision-makers simple and direct. Since 1948, the demands of Israeli security have required such a relationship, and for the most part, this system has served Israel well.

Questions concerning this system have arisen in light of the 1973 war experience. In this context, it is necessary to examine two aspects of the situation: communication within the military (IDF) itself; and the formal (and informal) channels between the military and Government policy-makers. At this point, we may note that, within the military, internal failures of intelligence analysis prevented it from reaching a position that mobilization and interceptive war were required.[44] Thus, in contrast to May 1967, the meeting of the General Staff of 5 October 1973 failed to conclude that it must press the Prime Minister and others in the "Kitchen Cabinet" for immediate action. In short, the proposal of an interceptive strike made by Chief of Staff Elazar to Defense Minister Dayan at 0600 on 6 October 1973 cannot be considered as having the full weight of the military behind it.

As far as its relationship with the Government is concerned, the military was unable to exert full influence on Mrs. Meir and her associates. To the extent the military had a consensual opinion, there was no breakdown in its communication to Mrs. Meir. Indeed, the

General Staff meeting of 5 October was ultimately moved to and concluded in Mrs. Meir's Tel-Aviv office (located within the Defense Ministry complex). On the following day CoS Elazar's recommendation of an interceptive strike was taken directly to Mrs. Meir by Dayan, where it was flatly rejected on political grounds.

Since October 1973, steps have been taken to avoid recurrence of these failures. On an informal basis additional channels are open for the communication of views. For example, frequent ad hoc discussions and meetings between the military and political leadership augment the formal channels and provide for a continuous and direct mode of policy influence. Even under Mrs. Meir CoS Elazar often participated in the informal discussions that comprised "Kitchen Cabinet" meetings. Under Mr. Rabin, a former CoS himself, close personal and working relationships with CoS Gur provide informal access and influence.

Evaluating the extent of IDF influence presents a more difficult problem. Since the precise nature of policy advocacy is secret, only rough estimates are possible. In the field of defense policy, pressure from the military to acquire more and higher quality weapons has been constant. Here the Government has responded by making all possible efforts, within the realm of political and economic possibility, to respond.[45] In addition, recommendations of the military on troop levels and other strategic matters have generally been followed.

On strategic level policy decisions the military has fared less well. In 1956, for example, pressure from the military failed to pre-

vent an Israeli decision to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza, and in May 1967 military efforts to induce a more rapid response to Nasser's challenge were of limited success.[46] During the 1973 war, the military's recommendation to reject the Soviet cease-fire ultimatum was voted down by the Cabinet. Given the military background of Israel's present political leadership, however, it can be expected that the military will exert influence in the making of any future strategic and settlement policy.

Non-Military Bureaucracies

On a subjective basis, the only ministries with possible influence over strategic and settlement policy are Israel's Defense and Foreign Ministries.[47] Other bureaucracies have no formal influence over policy-making, excepting an occasional minister for reasons unrelated to the ministry he heads.[48]

Within the Foreign Ministry there is no formal organization equivalent to the military's General Staff, although there has been a key group of senior staff referred to as the Hanhalah (Directorate).[49] Regular meetings of this group with the Foreign Minister provide a mechanism for communication and influence and the membership of the Foreign Minister in the Cabinet and top policy-making elite would seemingly provide the same formal channels. The only apparent limitation here is that the Defense Ministry is directly concerned with defense and strategic policy, where it is the role of the Foreign Ministry to advise on the diplomatic implications of policy options and explain

Israeli policy throughout the world. In actuality, considerable over-
lap exists, and the area of greatest commonality and influence for the
Foreign Ministry comes on the settlement issue. However, for reasons
previously discussed (see section 1.2) the use of this mode of influence
has been limited. The strong personal views of Foreign Ministers Meir,
Eban, and Allon have fairly well prevented this bureaucracy from
exerting influence over strategic and settlement policy-making to the
extent their views differ from the view of the Foreign Minister.

On an informal level, the modes of influence available to the
military are generally unavailable to the senior staff of the Foreign
Ministry. The close personal associations prevalent in the military
are uncommon. On the whole, the senior staff of the Foreign
Ministry, which does hold more accommodation-oriented policy positions
than its Minister, is a frustrated group unable to communicate their
views directly to the actual policy-makers or influence policy they do
not entirely support.

Knesset (Israeli Parliament)

In view of Israel's claim to be a "parliamentary democracy" it is
to be expected that the Knesset plays some role in policy-making. It
may be noted that in the foregoing identification of key publics, the
Knesset was not included. This analysis has chosen to consider the
parties which comprise the Knesset and the key publics they represent
rather than the Knesset itself.

The Knesset does, however, provide two modes of influence for parties

over the policy-making process. First, and most important, are the Knes-set debates over defense and settlement policy, in which direct influence over Government members of the Knesset is possible.[50] In actuality, direct access is often limited, as Government members attend irregularly and frequently refuse to seriously debate security policy when they do. For those parties which are also members of the Government coalition, influence is far more direct in coalition meetings and through their Cabinet representatives than in Knesset debate.

What influence the Knesset has comes from the ability of debate on security issues (frequently televised) to mold public opinion and thus indirectly influence policy-making and from the ultimate necessity of bringing crucial defense, security and settlement issues to a vote. Hence while Knesset influence may not be direct, the parameters placed on Government policy of what can be passed is of considerable importance. Further, it has the check of being able to "bring down" an unpopular Government through a vote of "no confidence".

The second mode of influence parties can utilize in the Knesset is the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (CFAS). While this Committee contains some of the most prestigious Knesset members, who are not members of the Government, and debates matters of strategic importance, it has little influence over actual policy-making. Although the Prime Minister and Defense Minister regularly brief the Committee and consult with it, the Committee's role is aptly summarized by one observer:

> The consensus of members, observers, officials and
> ministers is that the Knesset Committee was, for the
> most part, a consumer of information on foreign and
> security policy and only occasionally a decision-
> making organ.[51]

Coalition and Intrabloc Pressure

Another mode of influence often utilized by parties belonging to
the Government is to press alternative policies within the bloc. Since
coalitions are a necessary fact of political life in Israel, keeping
the coalition together requires policy-makers to pay attention to demands
made by coalition partners. The implicit threat here is that a
given party could withdraw from the coalition, with the possible
result that a majority of the Knesset seats is no longer controlled by
the Government. Loss of a majority has generally meant the fall of
the Government, requiring a new coalition be formed or new elections
or both.

In recent years the greatest threat in this regard has come from
NRP, with a strong possibility of the Rafi leaving again as they did
in 1965. Under present conditions, loss of NRP and Rafi support
would be highly injurious to the coalition. It can be taken for
granted that any shift in strategic or settlement policy, particularly
toward accommodation with the Arabs, will require the support of a
strong coalition. Thus members of the coalition are able to exert
considerable influence over the policies adopted through the parameters
which they place on policy they will accept.

Direct Public Opinion

A mode of influence employed by virtually all key publics is that
of direct public opinion. Efforts to mobilize public opinion are based
on the implicit assumption that Government policy cannot be adopted
or implemented without broad based public support. Over the years
Israeli public opinion has had a significant affect on policy, but
has not had the controlling effect one might assume.

Basic Israeli defense policy has had broad popular support and
with few exceptions public opinion has seldom been mobilized against
the Government. Notable exceptions are the changes in the composition
of the Government and its policy in May 1967 and the loss of
support by Mrs. Meir and Dayan after the 1973. More often than not,
policy-makers themselves have sought to mobilize public opinion in
support of policies adopted, rather than looking to public opinon
for guidance.

The real significance of public opinion lies in the limits and
parameters it places on policy alternatives. It is obvious that a
final settlement cannot be implemented which does not have the wide
support of the Israeli public and the ability of the Government to
mobilize support for official policy may prove to be as important as
the influence of public opinion on policy-making.

World Jewry

As mentioned, international organizations such as the World
Zionist Organization, the American Jewish Committee, WIZO, Hadassah,

and others work through their organizational and personal contacts in Israel to influence the making of policy in so far as they are able. Implicit is the threat that such organizations will be able to stop or restrict the flow of funds to Israel for development and other purposes, or, in the case of the United States, exert sufficient influence to limit the flow of vitally needed arms. It would appear that neither of these is an entirely credible threat, and correspondingly the world Jewish community has had limited efficacy as a mode of influence.

Certainly world Jewry has been used by Israel to help exert influence in other countries, but the extent of influence of the world Jewish community is seriously limited in Israel internally.

1.4   IMPACT OF THE 1973 WAR ON KEY PUBLICS

Shifts in Post-War Policies

The 1973 October War marked the first time since 1948 that Israel
had come under direct attack by Arab armies, and resulted in the first
major loss in public support for an Israeli government in a wartime
situation. While various charges and countercharges are still being
traded among the various political and military factions, it is
possible to identify shifts in the basic perceptions and policies of
many of the key publics considered above. Several of these changes
have already been noted, as they form a basic part of each group's
present policy position. Here, we review some of the more important
shifts and their impact on the policy-making process.

The Military: Criticism of the military prior to and during the
1973 war came from within the IDF as well as the public, and has
produced an ongoing reassessment of defense policy in light of that
experience. At the same time the Israeli Government conducted its
own official inquiry into IDF conduct, placing primary blame for any
"errors" on Chief of Staff Elazar and IDF Intelligence Chief Zeira.[52]

For the first time in recent history the military leadership split
over a number of issues related to the conduct of a war, including the
distribution and analysis of intelligence, failure of the Chief of Staff
to press the Prime Minister to undertake interceptive warfare, failure
of the General Staff to commit strategic reserves in Sinai when
required, failure of the General Staff to exploit the advance across

the Suez Canal to the fullest extent possible, and a failure to resist the imposition of a cease fire under threat of a Soviet ultimatum. The net effect of these charges and countercharges was to produce a sharp rift in the military leadership.

On one side of the conflict was the General Staff including CoS Elazar and on the other Gen. Ariel Sharon supported by a number of less senior officers as well as the Likud and NRP political parties. Sharon was able to spark a thorough review of most aspects of military operations and policy. With the departure of Sharon, CoS Elazar and IDF Intelligence Chief Ziera from active duty (all retain IDF reserve posts), the IDF was able to go about restoring a unified policy on basic defense and settlement questions. While it is still too early to define the precise nature and limits of changes in IDF policy, we can draw some preliminary conclusions.

First, the perceived "failure" of the IDF to achieve a complete and decisive victory in the 1973 war has led to the assertion of a policy calling for interceptive warfare in anticipation of any Arab attack. While qualitatively the same policy advocated by the IDF in 1967 and 1973, it seems that the military will likely press the political leadership to the greatest extent possible should a similar situation arise again. In short, the military is committed to preventing another "disaster".

Second, particularly in light of the 1973 war experience and the revised perceptions of Arab fighting abilities and armaments, the IDF has increased its pressure on the political leadership to obtain a

larger supply of higher quality weapons systems from the United States. In view of the American commitment to Israel, a fact previously held in some doubt, the IDF has pressed for an upgrading of IDF capabilities in almost all areas, with particular emphasis on:

(a) American fighter/bomber aircraft (F4, A4 and F15) along with advanced ECM and ECCM equpment;

(b) Supply of sophisticated ATG ordinance, including electro-optical and laser-guided systems;

(c) Exchange of technology with the United States under the existing exchange agreement, so Israel would have the capability to construct effective ECM equipment domestically;

(d) Increased stocks of anti-tank systems;

(e) Increased supplies of armored personnel carriers:

(f) Agreement in principle to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in adverse situations.

Finally, the revised policy of the IDF calls for reaction to Arab terrorism through an increased level of retaliation. In actuality this is merely a reemphasis of a policy espoused for many years.

What settlement policy is advocated by the IDF follows from strategic considerations and the experiences of prior wars. Present (June 1975) disengagement positions have been accepted for two basic reasons:[53] first, Israel still controls the strategic Mitla and Gidi passes in Sinai, the only "natural" obstacles between the Suez Canal and the Israeli heartland, and second, all major strategic targets

within Egypt are within range of the Israeli Jericho missile.

On the Syrian front, pressure continues to maintain strategic control of the Golan Heights and key tactical positions on Mt. Hermon. The lack of area for maneuver between Israeli settlements in the Galilee and the Heights has made retention of this land a key goal of IDF strategy. The IDF position does not, however, preclude some alternative security arrangement with respect to the Golan Heights.

Finally, the IDF strongly opposes reintroduction of a major Arab force capability in the critical West Bank.[54] If it is possible to restore Arab (or Palestinian) sovereignty over this area with sufficient guarantees that major weapons systems be kept out, such a policy could be acceptable to the IDF.

The NRP: As indicated, the NRP has become one of the pivotal groups in both coalition formation and policy flexibility. The shifts that have taken place in the Orthodox Jewish community and its representative, the National Religious Party (NRP) have already been considered.

Summarizing, it is possible to note a strengthening of the traditional force-centered orientation of NRP (which developed in the 1960's) to a position roughly equivalent to the nationalist right (Likud). Elements of this policy are not specific and include generalizations such as active retaliation, a strong IDF, more and better armaments, and retention of strategic positions. The NRP would support any use of interceptive warfare advocated by the IDF or Likud.

In terms of settlement policy, the NRP persists in its demand that accommodation with the Arab states not include the West Bank areas of

Judea, Samaria, and Jewish holy places in Jerusalem.

The basic shift of the NRP in the aftermath of the 1973 war has
not been so much one of actual policy as one of process. That is, the
shift of the party to the belief that accommodation with the Arab states
can only be accomplished with the broad based support of itself, Likud
and the left.

Organized Labor: To the extent Israel's organized labor and its
representative the Histadrut has a policy different from Mapai, it
has undergone a basic shift toward an accommodation-centered approach.
This group has always supported a settlement based on the concept of
an overall peace agreement.

In defense policy, the group still supports Government policy and
has not advocated a specific policy different from that recommended by
the IDF. Dismay exists among organized labor over the enormous rate
of military spending by the Government, but no alternative is seen
in view of the pressing demands of security. As far as the United
States is concerned, there has been a shift from a desire to remain
as independent as possible to recognition that Israel must depend on
the U.S. for both military and diplomatic support, as well as mediation
with the Arab states.

What concessions labor is willing to make in the settlement area
are unclear. What is evident is that the group is more accommodation-
oriented than either the general population or the Government coalition.

The Kibbutzim: As always, most kibbutz members continue to support
a strong force-centered defense policy. As in previous wars they provided

Israel's first line of defense and took the brunt of casualties. Least affected by the increased taxes, they have given full support to obtaining more and better arms, and have been generally critical of the U.S. (often referred to as "tardy Sam") in not supplying arms more rapidly than has been the case.

Similarly the kibbutzim have been highly critical of any concessions that would bring the enemy back to their doorsteps and resume the shelling which many experienced for some 20 years. Working against this has been a fundamental desire to reach some accommodation with the Arabs which will stop the repeated rounds of warfare and terrorist attacks which have taken a disproportionate toll on the kibbutzim. Thus the twin goals of short-run secruity and the necessity of an overall peace settlement have produced a basic tension in the policy advocacy of the kibbutzim.

World Jewery: Since the 1973 war, support for United States supply of arms to Israel and active diplomacy by the U.S. to bring about a disengagement of forces and an overall settlement has been virtually universal. The only criticism has been that Secretary of State Kissinger has been too accommodation-oriented and Israeli concessions in advance of an overall peace agreement could jeopardize Israeli security. Such concerns are, however, not widely held. Coupled with this is a fear among American Jews that anti-Israel and "oil" interests within the US. Defense and State Departments might serve to interrupt the flow of arms in the future. Thus, as far as arms supplies are concerned, the American Jewish community has become more force-oriented since 1973.

On settlement policy, however, American Jews continue to support concessions by Israel which could lead to an overall settlement. Considerable support exists for Israel's recognition of a Palestinian entity and return to the 4 June 1967 borders. Keeping in mind the fact that most American Jews lack an accurate conception of the strategic situation and hold unspecific views on boundaries, it can be assumed that they will support any settlement acceptable to the Israeli Government and underwritten by the major powers.

Civil Servants: In essential defense matters this group still defers to the military and Defense Ministry over actual policy. To the extent this group can exert influence, it has urged a more accommodation-centered policy with limitations on retaliation and, if possible, diplomatic, solutions rather than interceptive warfare.

The major shift has come in the field of settlement policy. The perceived time frame within which a settlement can be reached has been drastically reduced as a result of the 1973 war. While this group has traditionally been accommodation-oriented and favored territorial concessions, the need for immediate concessions to facilitate an agreement is now perceived. It does not, however, appear that such a view is presently reflected by its Minister.

Academics and Intellectuals: As indicated, the 1973 war gave rise to considerable debate within Israel's academic and intellectual community over the entire range of defense and settlement issues. In the area of defense policy, a split has developed with one faction moving toward the force-centered appraoch of the Likud, and the other to that of the

New Outlook writers, that a permanent accommodation must be reached
through immediate territorial concessions. While extreme views of accom-
modation are not widespread, it is clear that a majority supports a
wider range of concessions than that presently offered by the Govern-
ment.

Mapai and Mapam (Ma'arach): As a result of what were perceived as
failings in political and military leadership during the 1973 war, the
weight of public opinion in Israel demanded new leadership from Mapai,
particularly following the 1973 elections.[55] Prior to October 1973,
the real differences in the policies of the "big three" parties (Mapai,
Likud, NRP) had virtually dissipated. In Mapai the view that Israel
should withdraw from all "occupied" territories, advanced by Arie
Eliav (who has since moved to Ya'ad), Pinhas Sapir, and Yitzhak Ben-
Aharon was clearly a minority position. At the time, a majority of
Mapai supported the status quo, and party debate was over a compromise
"Galili plan" which was between the position of then Defense Minister
Dayan and Finance Minister Sapir.

Within Mapai, debate erupted and a fourteen point plan adopted
which has shifted emphasis to an accommodation-oriented goal of
"attaining peace and cooperation with the peoples of the area". While
the plan rejected a return to the 4 June 1967 borders, it did
recognize the need for compromise and territorial concessions, although
without mention of specific boundaries. This plan further toned
down references to Israel's role in the "occupied" territories.

Since 1973, a new debate has centered on whether the "Galili plan"

compromise has been repealed by the war. Finance Minister Sapir insisted it had and demanded a less force-centered policy. Mapam interpreted Sapir's statement as a radical move toward its own position of accommodation based on immediate and total withdrawal from the "occupied" territories and has recently demanded that the Government put forth a map of its minimal final demands as part of the ongoing settlement negotiations. The Rafi faction, led by Dayan, insisted the Galili plan had not been repealed, and that any new plan "overlay" the previous one. Bitter personal attacks brought the Prime Minister to the center of the storm, and a vote of confidence (291 to 33) backed Dayan.

A major difference of the Mapam plan concerned the Palestinians, calling for Palestinian self-determination in contradiction to the Prime Minister's statement "there is no such thing as a Palestinian" and that Palestinians either seek "self-identity" within Jordan or the "established" West Bank leadership. Mapam went on to suggest joining Gaza with the Palestinian entity, but stopped short of advocating an independent Palestinian state.

Despite her rejection of the more accommodation-oriented views within Ma'arach, Mrs. Meir categorically rejected the concept of forming a unity government with Likud, even when faced with Dayan's resignation over the issue. Public demands for new leadership finally caused the resignation of her Government.

It is less clear how Mapai and its associates have shifted under Rabin. There has been some shift toward the accommodation-centered

line of Mapam as indicated by criticism of the Rabin Government:

> In Mr. Rabin's Government, it is very clear indeed, that
> the majority (of the Government) will be far more ready
> to make concessions than most of those who voted for the
> Labour Party list headed by Mrs. Meir want.[56]

It is doubtful that the shift to the "left" suggested by this article

has been this substantial. Indeed, since the breakdown of the

Kissinger mission in March 1975, the Rabin position has undergone a

substantial shift to the right in refusing to offer additional con-

cessions.[57] Even Rafi, now under the direct leadership of Defense

Minister Peres, appears to support the more accommodation-oriented line

of the Mapai "center" than the right to which it had previously tended.

Likud: Following the 1973 war, the opposition Likud failed to

exhibit any real shift in position. Besides its involvement in the

national debate over the ineptitude and irresponsibility of the military

and political leadership during the war, it did not put forth alternative

policy. Instead, the Likud has campaigned for a unity government

including itself and the Mapai, as well as other parties.

In the December 1973 election, Likud reiterated its opposition to a

"repartition of Eretz Yisrael", but has not been specific on what this

means. Further, it has called for "direct negotiation of treaties at

a peace conference with the Arab states" and has eliminated its unqua-

lified rejection of withdrawals. Here it has shifted its position to

a rejection of "withdrawals which would endanger the peace and security

of the nation".

In defense policy, Likud has taken a position surprisingly similar to that of the other parties. Even in the 1973 war Likud's Menachem Begin has said such a pre-emptive strike would have been unnecessary "if the Government had placed sufficient forces in Sinai and the Golan Heights after receiving advance information about the Egyptian and Syrian buildup", in which case there would have been no war.[58] Here Begin's views probably represent those of a majority of the population.

Other Parties: In the wake of the 1973 war the minor parties have all undergone reformulations of their own positions, with varying degrees of detail about peace plans. For example, the small left-wing factions of Moked (Communists), Meri (Israel Radical Party, which holds no Knesset seats), and other ideological factions of the far left have failed to present any unified policy. Since the war, these groups have been engaged in an endless series of personality clashes, and have offered little.

Prior to the war, such groups generally supported Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 boundaries, a unified Jerusalem, and Israeli security through demilitarization of the Middle East based on international guarantees of some sort. In addition, they have strongly supported the right of Palestinian self-determination. There is no evidence they have changed this line.

Post-War Shifts in Influence

For all of the debate and turmoil that has characterized Israel in the post-war period, real shifts in the mode and extent of influence

on the military and political decision process are few. Surprisingly,
in view of the strong public demand for "new leadership", following
the 1973 war, relatively little change has taken place anywhere either
in the military or the political leadership. Thus, we can conclude,
that although the potential for change is enormous, the political
leadership has not presented any new and viable alternatives from
which to choose, and the public has effectively failed to force changes
in either leadership or policy.

An opportunity for change existed in the 1973 elections, but
little was realized. One third of the members elected to the Eighth
Knesset are new faces, but these new faces in no way make for new
leadership or new policy. The "old guard" of the Labor Alignment
(Ma'arach) remains, and the Knesset remains essentially powerless and
dominated by the ·Government, which in turn is dominated by the Prime
Minister. At this level, public opinon was able to force some change,
in securing the resignation of Mrs. Meir and Mr. Dayan, In some
ways Mr. Rabin, and even Mr. Peres, represent "new leadership" although
the Mapai, as well as the other parties are still in the hands of the
established leadership.

The change in the Prime Minister's office, as well as the Defense
and Foreign Ministries, have brought some changes, but these appear to
be more of process than basic policy. Government policy has tended to
shift leftward in accepting accommodation, despite the mood of the
electorate. This shift would seem to be explained by the pressures
of the strategic situation, perceived pressure from the United States,

and a need for the Government to "buy time" to restore the IDF and search for a political settlement.

Polarization of Israel's voters toward force-centerd and accommodation-centered modes, as witnessed in the 1973 elections, has served to both lessen the gap between left and right and further reduce the impact of the minor fringe parties. Since these parties have had virtually no influence over policy-making, their demise would have no direct impact on policy, but could help give Israel a two-party system, which could have a substantial impact.

Looking to the Israeli military, there has been some visable increase in their influence. Again, it is difficult to determine how much of this is a reaction to the 1973 war and a desire to keep better informed, or merely the result of a new Prime Minister with a military background. In any event it is clear that the military will have considerable impact for some time to come.

The non-military bureaucracies considered earlier have generally failed to gain influence. To some extent the change in the Foreign Minister, from Eban to Allon, means potentially greater influence within the Foreign Ministry and hence on the policy process. The mechanics and demands of the disengagement process and possible settlement negotiations have caused a greater reliance on the senior staff of the Foreign Ministry, but it is difficult to state the actual amount of influence exerted by this group. Their role remains essentially one of implementation.

More difficult to analyze are the shifts which have taken place

within the Government coalition. However, we note within Ma'arach
(Alignment) increased importance of Ahdut Ha'avodah, as well as in
the personalities of Allon and Rabin. With the NRP gone from the
coalition for part of 1974, Ahdut Ha'avodah, Mapam and Rafi factions
have all been able to exert more influence than previously. With
the return of the NRP, it is unclear how far back this balance will
shift. It is likely that some of the shift to the left within the
coalition will remain, at least until new elections or the formation
of a national unity government, barring any major change in American-
Israeli relations. It seems clear that the policies advocated by
these factions place major limits on the flexibility of the Government,
since defection of any major faction would leave the coalition too
weak to remain in power. As it is, it seems unlikely that the present
coaltion will be able to make the concessions necessary to achieve
a permanent settlement and possibly a second state interim accord.

Here, it is clear that public opinion has come to play a greater
role in the formation of policy. Since the "disaster" of 1973, the
Government no longer can take broad-based support for granted. In
defense, the Government has attempted to meet public reaction by
adopting a more active retaliation policy and has demonstrated a far
greater willingness to undertake mobilization in response to Arab
actions. On settlement issues, the Government has not followed the
rightward shift in public opinion and it is unclear to what extent
accommodation will be tolerated.

NOTES

PART ONE

1. See Abraham R. Wagner, Political Change and Decision-Making in Israel: The Aftermath of the October War (Washington: U.S. Department of State, Office of External Research, August, 1974). Hereafter, Wagner (1974:1).

2. The evolution of Israel's early strategic policy and relations with the major powers are described in Shabtai Rosenne, "Basic Elements of Israel's Foreign Policy," India Quarterly (Delhi) 12 (October/December 1961); David Ben-Gurion, "Israel's Security and her International Position after the (1956) Sinai Campaign," State of Israel, Government Year-Book 5720, 1959/60, Jerusalem, IGPO; Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972); and Abraham R. Wagner, Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973 (New York: Praeger, 1974) Hereafter, Wagner (1974:2). The perceptions of these developments by two principal members of the present Israeli Government are found in Shimon Peres, David's Sling (London: Widenfeld and Nicholson, 1970), and Yigal Allon, The Making of Israel's Army (London: Collins, 1970).

3. The two wellsprings of opposition to this force-centered policy were a segment of extreme Jewish Orthodoxy, which believed that "Zion" could not be established by force of arms, and the far left which traditionally advocated accommodation with the Arabs and a political alliance with the Soviet Union.

4. A framework for analysis is suggested by Joseph deRivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968), and Wagner (1974:2), op. cit.

5. With the exception of the first weeks of the 1948 War of Independence. This conclusion is supported by conversations that author conducted with members of the Israeli leadership, February - March 1974. See also Anthony H. Cordesman and Cdr. Robin Pirie, ISMILAID (U) (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment, 1974). The latter report is based on classified data.

6. See Brecher, op. cit., and Wagner (1974:2), op. cit. for extensive compilations of the literature in this area.

7. Menachem Begin, interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, February 1974.

8. While not a "delphic" pronouncement, this identification involves the use of the Israeli press, public opinion polls (by IIASR and DAHAF), election studies, personal interviews and subjective judgement. See also Aaron Antonovsky, "Classification Forms, Ideology, and the Man in the Street," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (1960); and Aaron Antonovsky and Alan Arian, Hopes and Fears of Israelis: Consensus in a New Society (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1972).

9. Further employed here are both written and public statements by Israeli decision-makers, personal interviews with the author (1967-75) as well as Michael Brecher (1948-74) and Janice Stein (1970-74). See also the framework suggested in Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956).

10. See, for example, "Israel's Oriental Immigrants and Oriental Druzes," Minority Rights Group Report No. 12 (London: 1973).

11. Ibid., p. 14.

12. See, for example, Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Israel (London: Cass, 1969).

13. Brecher, op. cit., pp. 163-172.

14. The classic statement of Herut policy can be found in Menachem Begin, "Conceptions and Problems of Foreign Policy," Ha'uma (in Hebrew) Tel-Aviv, (March 1966), pp. 462-470.

15. For detailed statements of this theoretical base see Wagner (1974:2) op. cit.; Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957); William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1962); and Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd Ed.) (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

16. See deRivera, op. cit., and Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (1962), pp. 244-252.

17. See, for example, Perlmutter, op. cit., and Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969).

18. Dr. Harkabi was then in charge of strategic studies in the Ministry of Defense, and is former Director of Military Intelligence. He presently serves as a key advisor to Minister of Defense Shimon Peres.

19. A detailed analysis of the decision process is found in Wagner (1974:2), op. cit.

20. Brecher, op. cit., p. 136.

21. NRP Election Brochure for 1955 (in Hebrew). At the time all major
    factions were willing to accept these lines as permanent within the
    context of an overall settlement.

22. Agudat Yisrael Election Brochure for 1959 (in Hebrew).

23. With the exception of several months in 1974.

24. Arms sales from the United States were secured on a limited basis
    in 1962 from President Kennedy, and on a major scale beginning in
    1969 under President Nixon. See Shimon Peres, David's Sling, op. cit.

25. This disdain for the United Nations is shared by Ben-Gurion's younger
    protege Shimon Peres, who has toned down his public statements regarding
    the U.N. since assuming the role of Defense Minister in 1974.

26. Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: The Armed Prophet (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
    Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 235.

27. See, for example, Nahum Goldmann, "Military Strength is not Enough,"
    New Outlook (Tel-Aviv) (June 1963), pp. 12-16, and Nahum Goldmann,
    "The Future of Israel," Foreign Affairs, 48 (April 1970), pp. 443-459.

28. See, The American Jewish Committee, In Vigilant Brotherhood (New York:
    1965).

29. "New Paths of Peace Between Israel and the Arab Countries," New Outlook
    (Tel-Aviv) 51 (February 1963), pp. 17-18.

30. Shima Flapan, "Wonderful Logic -- All Wrong," New Outlook (Tel-Aviv)
    56 (September 1963), pp. 26-32.

31. Shima Flapan, "Beginnings that Bore Fruit," New Outlook (Tel-Aviv)
    52 (March/April 1963), p. 20.

32. See Wagner (1974:1), op. cit., and Don Peretz, "The War Elections and
    Israel's Eighth Knesset," Middle East Journal, 28 (Spring 1974).

33. See Uri Avneri, Israel Without Zionists: A Plea for Middle-East Peace
    (New York: 1968).

34. A number of academics have been active in the Mapai Central Committee,
    including Emanuel Gutmann and others. See Emanuel Gutmann, "Some
    Observations on Parties and Politics in Israel," India Quarterly
    (Delhi) 17 (January/March 1961).

35. See New Outlook (Tel-Aviv), 44 (May 1962), p. 12.

36. See, for example, Alan Dowty, "Israeli Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation," in J. Holst, Security, Order and the Bomb (Amsterdam: Universitesforlaget, 1972), and "Israel Nuclear Policy," (unpublished paper, 1975).

37. See the Jerusalem Post, 14 April 1970.

38. See Wagner (1974:2), op. cit.

39. See Yigal Allon, "The Making of Israel's Army: The Development of Military Conceptions of Liberation and Defence," in Michael Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War (London: Cassell, 1965), pp. 335-371, and Yigal Allon, "Active Defense -- A Guarantee for Our Existence," Molad (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv) 212 (July/August 1967).

40. Central to the discussion here is the ongoing debate in Israel over the politicization of the IDF. The basic charge is the the IDF, which is supposed to be apolitical, has tended to promote Mapai officers, and that Likud generals such as Ariel ("Arik") Sharon were passed over for Chief of Staff in favor of less-qualified Mapai men.

41. The appeal of this novel concept of "fluid" borders seems to be more rhetorical than practical.

42. Instructive here are the private reports of Mr. Nixon's meeting with this group during his 1968 visit to Israel as a private citizen.

43. Party platform published in the Jerusalem Post, 20 June 1975, p. 3.

44. For a detailed analysis of these "failings" see Wagner (1974:1), op. cit. and Yeshoyahu Ben-Porat et. al., Ha-Michdal ("The Omission") (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: 1973), translated as Kippur (Tel-Aviv: Special Edition Publishers, 1974).

45. See Peres, op. cit.

46. Although the military finally prevailed. See Wagner (1974:2), op. cit.

47. An exception may be the Ministry of Transport which is involved in military logistics. Because of the issue's importance, almost all of the civil servants in Israel would like to believe that their position is somehow central to the security of the state, and that they are in a position of influence. Interestingly, those closest to actual power are the first to recognize their limitations.

48. A good example here is (Res.) Gen. Chiam Bar-Lev, Minister of Commerce and Industry, who is former Chief of Staff and a close personal associate of many in the political and military leadership.

49. Namely the Director-General, Assistant Directors-General, Advisers, and relevant Department Directors in addition to others invited at the pleasure of the Minister on an ad hoc basis.

50. As in the British system, Cabinet members are generally (although not necessarily in Israel) Knesset members, and are supposed to respond to questions posed to them in debate. In practical terms, all questions in the security area put recently have been "referred to committee", effectively terminating any open Knesset discussion.

51. Brecher, op. cit., p. 427.

52. See the Report of the Agranat Commission, summarized in The New York Times, 4 April 1974. Full text of the public summary, Israel Government Press Office, April 1974.

53. For a discussion of current Israeli security perceptions, see Minister of Defense Shimon Peres, Ma'ariv (in Hebrew) 15 April 1975, pp. 13-14. Reported in FBIS, 18 April 1975, pp. N1-N8.

54. See Moshe Dayan, "Israel's Border and Security Problems," Foreign Affairs, 33 (January 1955), pp. 250-267

55. See Peretz, op. cit.

56. "The Worst Government," The Israel Economist (Tel-Aviv), (May 1974), p. 84.

57. See, for example, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, interview in Hazofe (in Hebrew), 15 May 1975, pp. 3,4. Reported in FBIS, 16 May 1975, pp. N1-N7.

58. Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, February 1974.

PART TWO

SOCIETAL CONSTRAINTS ON ISRAELI SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS

2.1   INTRODUCTION

Rational Choice and Policy-Making

Central to understanding the flexibility Israel's political and
military leadership is able to exercise, and hence the demands Israel
places on the United States, are the constraints which Israeli society,
previously conceptualized as key publics, place on defense, security
and settlement policy. The net effect of these influential groups and
their differing perceptions of the strategic situation has been the
emergence of a set of centrifugal forces and tensions within Israeli
society. Here, we consider the specific policy constraints these
variables place on Israeli leadership and its flexibility in the
search for an overall settlement with the Arab states.

As discussed, the framework for the present analysis is that of
a rational decision process, in which the decision-maker selects
those options and alternatives which maximize his end goals as he
perceives them. Such goals include both the "self-interested" goals
of power and interest maximization, as well as collective interests such
as security and settlement.

For most of the primary goals considered here there exists a consen-
sus within Israel's key publics. Namely, these publics seek a long-
term peace with the Arab states and an overall Middle East settlement
based on recognized and secure borders. Differences of opinion exist,
however, over both short-run security considerations and the parameters
within which settlement policy can be made.

Constraints on Israeli Leadership

In this analysis, the focus is on areas of actual and potential constraint which serve to define the bounds within which viable Israeli policy can be formulated. Here viable policy is defined as official policy which can be expected to have sufficient popular and Knesset support to be implemented.

The major constraints considered are the end goals of the major groups in Israeli society as well as their perceptions of common end goals; external parameters placed on Israeli leadership by the United States, the Arab states, the Soviet Union, and other powers; and internal parameters that the Israeli leadership faces.

Here we seek to define both the direction and limits of each factor for the key publics which seek to influence policy. By aggregating these constraints over the influential key publics, as well as the Israeli general public as a whole, it is possible to arrive at an approximation of policy limits on both present leadership and alternative leadership coalitions.

Parameters of Settlement

An additional line of approach followed is an examination of the flexibility possible on each of the major variables. This analysis explores the specific options which are perceived as being available by the present political and military leadership and those groups which seek to influence policy.

The parameters include strategic considerations such as weapons

systems, international guarantees of security, territorial concessions, demilitarization and economic aid. The end product of this are "sets" or packages of alternative policy combinations acceptable to Israel which could form the basis for an overall settlement.

2.2   END GOALS

Introduction

This is the first of three sections which lay out the fundamental constraints on Israeli leadership, both political and military, in the making of policy. As is the case with all decision-making problems, the end goals of both the actual decision-makers and the general public form one set of policy parameters. In some cases, these are goals to be maximized, and in others minimum strategic objectives which must be met if the requisite public support for implementation of the policy is to be obtained.

Considered here are some of the essential, minimal end goals on which general consensus presently exists and any foreseeable Israeli leadership will be forced to deal with.

Long Run Survival of Israel

The principal goal of Israeli policy is the long run existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. This has been summed up by one of the architects of early Israeli policy, and remains a cornerstone of policy-making today:

> Against this complex background (modern Jewish history) the single objective of Israel's foreign policy can be stated in quite concrete terms. It is to mobilize all the resources of diplomacy for the protection and preservation of itself (Israel) as it is. This is no different, of course from the basic objective of the foreign policy of any other State, and although to that extent commonplace it nevertheless well bears repetition as it is so often overlooked. . .

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the State's continued existence and its continued security
and prosperity are equally the survival of the Jewish people.
Such preoccupation with national survival--both spiritual and
physical--engendered by a sense of historic mission would
impress its stamp on Israel's foreign relations under all
circumstances. It is even more prominent as things are
when Israel found itself from the moment of its inception
beset by powerful enemies bent on its complete physical
destruction.[1]

Four specific reasons are offered in support of this position.
First, all Jews who desire to make their home in Israel must be able
to do so "in full human dignity" and with freedom of movement. Second,
as a result of the untenable position Jews have found themselves in
in many European lands, Israel cannot be indifferent to their plight.
Third, Israel must exist as a vital spiritual and cultural link between
itself and the Jewish communities of the world. Fourth, the State
exists to provide for the resettlement of many Diaspora Jews.

Thus, in the view of Israeli leaders, Israel not only exists as
a Jewish homeland, but as the last hope for millions of the world's
Jews who have no other place to go. In practical terms, this causes
the leadership to view Israel as an end in itself, to be preserved
at all costs, and serves to explain the widespread feeling that Israel
must survive as a Jewish State as well.

Viewed in this context, it is possible to understand the often
repeated Israeli demand that as a precondition to any negotiated
settlement it receive sufficient assurances from the Arab states, as
well as guarantees from third parties, that its right to exist will not
be challenged. However, this does not mean a consensus exists over the
specific geographical boundaries the State of Israel should occupy.

Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that direct and continued assurances to the Israeli leadership that the integrity of Israel as a Jewish state will be guaranteed in any settlement will help to maximize flexibility in other areas.

Short Run Security Considerations

Of a more problematic nature than ultimate survival are a host of short-run, ongoing security considerations. Combining military elements with technology, geography, and other factors, these goals call for Israel maintaining its security through active deterrence of the Arab states, external terrorist attacks, and internal dissension.

At a minimum, these considerations include:

(a) Active deterrence of the Arab states from possible first strikes on Israeli positions;

(b) Israeli capability to undertake both first and second strike actions against the Arab states as conditions might warrant. Included here is the capability to undertake limited operations against hostile forces;

(c) Ability to check or control terrorist incursions. While no leader expects to "hermetically seal" the borders, protection of border settlements from escalated terrorist strikes has become increasingly important;

(d) Maintaining secure borders, or interim cease-fire lines, in the absence of a negotiated settlement;

(e) Maintaining technological superiority in weapons systems.

On all of these "objectives", limited consensus exists as to how such objectives are to be operationalized. Considerable debate arises, however, as to how they can be achieved.

For example, in the area of active deterrence, a variety of views can be seen, ranging from the hard view of Shimon Peres that Israel

"must be prepared for new challenges," and must "remain strong, fortified and able to meet any menace,"[2] to the more moderate stand of Moshe Dayan and Chaim Herzog, who look more toward a _modus vivendi_ acceptable to Israel and Egypt. Still more moderate are the views of Abba Eban and Nahum Goldmann. Eban has doubted Israel's ability to secure the present disengagement agreements, while Goldmann has called for "full peace" as an answer to short-run security problems.[3]

Basically, this set of short-run objectives forms a "package" of goals which any policy must address, but if any flexibility is to be achieved in this area, it will stem from a change in the conditions which go with these security problems in the first place.

Territorial Settlement Goals

Territorial considerations must be viewed in terms of both short-run security considerations and long-run settlement goals.

Since 1948 it has been the belief of a majority of the Israeli population and the groups that represent it that peace can only be maintained on the basis of secure borders for Israel and the 1949 Armistice lines (4 June 1967 border) constitute a close approximation to such borders.[4] As these were the borders granted to Israel by international agreement (at least in the United Nations), they were seen as Israel's rightful territorial claim. Since then, Israeli political and military leaders alike have maintained that in an overall settlement these are the only secure borders which Israel can, or ought to obtain.[5]

Consistent with this perception has been a fundamental belief that

the partition plan and subsequent frontiers of the 1949 Armistice Agreements provide ample room and resources for Israel to exist, grow and prosper as a Jewish state.

One major source of debate in Israel today stems from the view that the 1949 Armistice lines (4 June 1967 borders) are indefensible. Short of an overall negotiated settlement with neighboring Arab states, these borders are seen as continuing security problems. Speaking some 20 years ago, Moshe Dayan summed up Israeli feeling:

> The area of the country is only 8,100 square miles. But owing to the configuaration of its territory there are 400 miles of frontier. Three quarters of the population of Israel lives in the coastal plain. . . This densely settled area has an average width of no more than twelve miles between the Mediterranean and the Jordanian border. . . The country's main roads and railways are exposed to swift and easy incursion. Scarcely anywhere in Israel can a man live or work beyond the easy range of enemy fire. . .
>
> Thus the term "frontier security" has little meaning in the context of Israel's geography. The entire country is a frontier, and the whole rhythm of national life is affected by any hostile activity from the territory of neighboring states.[6]

It is still the case now, however, that stages short of these borders are referred to as "interim" lines, indicating acceptance of the idea that the pre-1967 borders will be the ultimate frontier.

A second source of debate, arising since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in the 1967 War, is over the retention of Judea and Samaria, which are of religious significance, particularly to the orthodox in Israel. This position is most strongly stressed by the NRP.

Beyond the NRP, little support for such permanent annexation exists. However, some verbal support was temporarily offered for a "greater Israel" by the <u>Likud</u> bloc during the 1973 election campaign, but has been conspicuously dropped:

> Mr Begin is no longer saying '<u>rak kach</u>' ('only thus', the former party slogan that accompanied a drawing of a hand clutching a gun on a map of the whole of the original area of the mandate, including what is now Jordan).

> Mr. Begin now proposes a three-year truce during which talks could be held on all issues, including borders. There is nothing wrong with the plan except there are no Arabs, dissident or otherwise, to support it, and there is very little except the phrasing to distinguish it from what the government seeks. It is perhaps a point for the Arab world to ponder that their intransigence has pushed the two major parties in Israel so close together. . .

> The Herut conference has no decided the status of Hebron. . . the only opposition came from the left-wing Jewish groups. If the session proved anything it may have been that, in the long run, Arab-Israeli relationships will prove more important, and difficult than borders.[7]

Recent statements by a range of Alignment leaders confirms this generally held goal of settlement with the pre-June 1967 borders.

Pinhas Sapir:

> We must make loud and clear that for peace we are prepared to withdraw from all those (occupied) territories not vital to our security. . . so as to prevent another war.[8]

Abba Eban:

> Israel does not have the strength to maintain a state in the borders of the present disengagement agreements, against the will of the Arab world, and without international support. But we do have the strength to maintain a state in the 1967 borders, with the addition of strategic adjustments.[9]

Moshe Dayan:

> The line I would like to see in a final settlement between us and Egypt should provide us with security, but it shouldn't provoke another war.[10]

Within the context of a general settlement, most groups and individuals speak of the 1967 borders with "strategic adjustments," although no consensus exists over the exact nature and extent of alterations. Such final goals are to some degree flexible, but the following modifications appear common:

(a) Retention of Jerusalem and its holy places (to Judaism), either as an Israeli entity, or as an internationalized area;

(b) Annexation of several Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights established since the 1967 War;

(c) Modification of access routes to Jerusalem, particularly in the Latrun area;

(d) Return of the Sinai, Gaza, West Bank and Golan Heights areas on a basis that they be largely demilitarized.

Other Goals

Several additional goals, or strategic objectives, are generally mentioned in any discussion of Israeli policy options. All of these objectives have majority support among Israel's decision-makers and the Israeli population as a whole.

Economic Goals: Consensus exists on the following to be achieved as part of any overall settlement:

(a) Free passage of Israeli ships and cargo through the Straits of Tiran to the Israeli port of Eilat;

(b) Passage of Israeli bound ships and cargo through the Suez Canal, although this, in view of Israeli ports on both the Mediterranean and Red Seas, is secondary to (1);

(c) End of the Arab economic boycott, and the ability of Israel to obtain crude oil supplies in the open market;

(d) Establishment of economic intercourse with the Arab states, including trade, telecommunications, aircraft and other commercial links.

Religious Goals: It can be taken as a sine qua non of any settlement that Israeli Jews be guaranteed full and free access to all Jewish holy places. The Israeli leadership and public will never permit reestablishment of the conditions that existed under the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

Social and Other Considerations: Beyond the fundamental goals already enumerated, the Israeli leadership and population hold as basic the right of all Jews to freely emigrate to Israel, and for Israel to be able to maintain its close ties to the Jewish communities of the Diaspora. Here it can be taken for granted that Israel will never agree to voluntarily restrict immigration, or participate in any settlement containing such restrictions.

2.3 EXTERNAL PARAMETERS

Introduction

The second category of factors which serves to constrain the
Israeli leadership and limit its policy flexibility is the set of
external parameters. These are the variables and forces which are
perceived as being determined outside of Israel, but which bear
directly on Israel's security and settlement options.

By and large this category is composed of the perceptions,
policies, and potential actions of other nations and international
organizations. The most influential of these are the United States,
the Soviet Union, the Arab States, the United Nations and a few
third countries such as France and Germany.

Regardless of Israel's own goals and ambitions, it is the actions
and aid of these external forces that will in large measure determine
what options and alternatives are ultimately feasible.

United States Support and Supply

Of critical concern in Israeli thinking is the way that American
support (economic, military, diplomatic) is viewed by decision-makers
and the extent to which they are willing to rely on United States
efforts, assurances and guarantees. Throughout its history, Israel's
relations with the superpowers have been the subject of an intense
internal debate.[11] In the past, supplies of American arms have been
elusive, until recently, the goal of securing them seemed doubtful.[12]

The advent of the Nixon Administration in 1969 and the massive American support effort in the 1973 War proved to be a watershed in American-Israeli relations. However, debate continues over the degree to which the United States is truly committed to maintaining Israel's strategic balance with the Arab states, and what political support can be expected in settlement negotiations. Indicative of current thinking is a statement by Moshe Dayan, who described Israel's relations with the United States as "the most positive phenomenon of this generation" and went on to say "I do not believe that their frindship is shallow, or that they would sell us for the sake of a few dollars less per ton of oil."[13]

A more skeptical view is that of Shimon Peres, who compares United States efforts to banker's credits: "You can get them if you have convinced the bank that you don't need them, nobody wants to run the risk."[14]

Military aid and long-range guarantees of supply: One parameter which the Israeli leadership has linked directly to settlement is American guarantees of a continued supply of the advanced weapons systems necessary to maintain the present quantitiative and qualitative strategic balance vis-a-vis the Arab states. By popular estimate, Israel anticipates receiving some $2.5 billion in aid during the 1976 fiscal year, including sophisticated military equipment. While considerable concern has been voiced over delays and problems in obtaining certain advanced systems, Israelis view with favor statements such as one recently made by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger that "the U.S. can provide

the resources to sustain Israeli fighting should a new war erupt."

Of considerable concern, however, has been the recent supply
of American arms to various Arab states. Voicing the Alignment position,
one report addressed a recent sale to Saudi Arabia:

> The supply of American arms in such vast amounts to an
> Arab country is liable to disrupt the balance of forces
> throughout the Middle East. Israel cannot accept the
> notion that such planes and weapons will not be placed
> at the disposal of another country, in time of war. . .
> such American competition. . .adds fuel to the flames that
> the Arab states are fanning around Israel.[15]

Political support in the world community: Isolated within the
Middle East region, and to some extent in the global community,
Israel has increasingly been forced to seek support from the United
States and few other powers. Following their pre-emptive strike
in June 1967, Israeli leaders became sensitive to charges of
"aggression", at least until October 1973, when then Prime Minister
Meir rejected the suggestion of another pre-emptive strike, primarily
because of a perceived inability to gain American and other worldwide
support for Israel on such short notice.[16]

Since the 1973 war, Israeli thinking and public opinion has
shifted toward the more balanced view that long run American support
is vital, and that any policy must have at least implicit U.S. backing.
Short-run security considerations, however, cannot be made conditional
on American approval.

Even though United Nations effectiveness in the Middle East in
promoting a settlement has been largely discounted, Israeli decision-

makers view with particular interest American support and action on related questions in the General Assembly and Security Council. United States actions there have been taken in Israel as signs of potential variation in American support.

American efforts toward negotiating a settlement: The greatest divergence in Israeli perceptions occurs in this highly sensitive area. For the most part this parameter had become personalized in the Kissinger mission and more recently the efforts of President Ford. As evident from the constant flow of press reports from Israel, the perceptions of various key groups ran from extreme skepticism and a feeling of U.S. pressure to actual trust.

The Israeli leadership's most pragmatic view of American efforts has recently been stated by Defense Minister Peres: .

> (Israel) cannot escape the fact (that it) is likely to
> be called upon to pay a price, so that other forces,
> including those friendly to her, can maintain their
> influence and guarantee their legitimate interests in
> the Middle East. There is nothing wrong with that, and
> there is no point in ignoring a demand of this sort. . .[17]

Other groups and leaders do not hold such a pragmatic view. Reservations about U.S. pressure on the Israeli leadership have been expressed within the leadership by such individuals as Information Minister Aharon Yariv (resigned 29 January 1975) and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon.

Additional evidence of the Israeli leadership's increasing realization of the limits placed on Israeli policy by the United States came in Prime Minister Rabin's response to the Likud proposal

for a three-year truce with the Arab states. Here Rabin dismissed the "Begin plan" as "an unlikely export article which U.S. politicians would not buy."[18]

American security guarantees and willingness to underwrite a settlement reached with the Arab states: Here, it follows from previous discussion, as well as the Israeli perception of the United States role in the Middle East, that Israeli policy is linked to the extent to which the U.S. is willing to underwrite Israel's security. Thus, a range of opinion exists over the potential American role and Israeli responses to American proposals. In general, the Alignment leadership feels that strong U.S. guarantees of support, such as a long term arms agreement, would permit Israel a greater degree of flexibility in settlement negotiations and concessions to the Arab states. To a large extent Likud supports this view as well.

Soviet Threats and Arab Support

A major variable in current Israeli thinking is the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and its impact on the security situation.[19] Here it is important to note that, since the break in diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. in 1967, Israeli distrust of the Soviet Union has dramatically increased.

At present, little consensus exists over the degree to which the Soviets will either support or sabotage an overall settlement, and to what extent they will continue to supply the Arab states with advanced weapons systems. Although pessimism about the Soviet role

in negotiations and settlement is widespread, the view of the govern-
ment is that Soviet objectives in the Middle East include continued
tension among the parties. Speaking recently Premier Rabin said:

> I wouldn't say the Russian's purpose is the destruction
> of Israel, but the prevention of conditions conducive
> to peace.[20]

A similar view is expressed by Defense Minister Peres, who
continues to view the Soviets as a weapons supplier to the Arab
states. He has recently stated:

> . . .we are well aware of all that goes on in the area.
> We know the Russians are here. . .We know that Lenin's
> latest student (Libyan leader Ma'ammar) Gaddafi has con-
> cluded a huge arms deal with the Russians.[21]

A more optimistic view of the Soviet role has been voiced by
Dr. Nahum Goldmann who has urged the inclusion of the Soviets in
settlement negotiations:

> The Russians don't have the power to bring peace, but they
> can sabotage peace. . .The Russians don't want a Pax
> Americana.[22]

Speaking of the Arab leaders, Goldmann continues:

> In the wake of the (1973) Yom Kippur War. . .moderate
> leaders in the Arab world are ready for peace. They fear
> Russia more than the Zionists, and want to get closer
> to the U.S.[23]

While these views of the Soviet role and Arab interest are held
among Israel's leftist parties, they are not prevalent in the present

military and political leadership.

As most Israelis perceive the situation, the key to Soviet involvement in the Middle East has been their relationship with Egypt and secondarily to Syria, but the future Soviet role in the Middle East is seen to be in a state of flux and the Soviet-Egyptian relationship uncertain.[24] Of increasing importance will be the Soviet role in the "non-confrontation" Arab states, such as Libya and others, although the pattern of this involvement and its impact on the conflict is presently uncertain.

The United Nations and Third Parties

Far less important, but worth mention, are the constraints posed by the United Nations and third party nations. Since 1960, at least, it has been clear to the Israeli leadership that the U.N. could not pass any pro-Israeli resolutions, and the 1967 experience demonstrated that as an active force in the Middle East, the U.N. was incapable of maintaining peace. Since the 1973 War, the role of the U.N. has been almost totally supplanted by the United States and the Kissinger missions.

Belatedly, the Geneva Conference was called under U.N. auspices, but few in Israel perceive the U.N.'s role in negotiations as serving more than a host function. Similarly, use of United Nations (UNEF and UNDOF) forces to man disengagement lines is viewed as an accommodation to the parties involved and the superpowers, rather than as an activity of the U.N. in keeping the peace.

Thus, the United Nations is in a relatively poor position to exert either influence over Israeli policy or affect the flexibility of Israeli policy-makers. In sum, the disdain which Ben-Gurion and his protogees developed for the United Nations after 1948, coupled with the inability of this world organization to prevent successive rounds of Middle East warfare, rule out any substantial role for it in influencing Israeli policy and furthering settlement negotiations.[25]

Similarly, the role of other nations in Israeli policy-making has been attenuated since the 1973 War. From 1948 through 1973 Israel was extremely interested in the support and aid of other nations, and sought to be responsive to their expressed desires for three major reasons. First, Israel had a pressing need to obtain weapons which could not be manufactured domestically. Second, its total isolation in the Middle East region compelled Israel to seek diplomatic support elsewhere. Here as Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir turned her attention to the nations of Africa and Foreign Minister Eban to the nations of Europe and Asia. Third, a desire existed, for both economic and ideological reasons, to align Israel with the nations of the "third world" and supply such nations with such skills and technology as it had available. This in turn was expected to yield additional political support for the Israeli cause.

It became apparent in 1967 and more so in 1973 that these policies have been fruitless in yielding political support. Thus, today, there is little that these nations can do to affect Israeli policy flexibility. With the cessation of major arms shipments from

France and Germany and the weakening of political support in the aftermath of the 1973 War, the influence of these major European nations has diminished.

Arab Capabilities and Attitudes

The final and most important category of external parameters are Israeli perceptions of Arab military capabilities and attitudes toward settlement. Of all the parameters considered, there is none which is less well perceived by both the Israeli leadership and public.

Arab military capabilities: While it is not the express purpose of the present study to analyze the military lessons of the 1973 War, it is necessary to note the dramtic changes in Israeli perceptions of Arab military capabilities that took place and the impact these have had on Israeli decision-making.[26]

Despite many Egyptian and Syrian shortcomings in the 1973 War, and whether or not the Arab armies employed Soviet doctrines, they did manage to upset both the balance of power in the Middle East, as well as Israeli perceptions of their military capabilities. On both the operational and tactical levels the Arabs posed substantial problems for Israel.

Before October 1973 there was a widespread belief among the Israeli leaders and public alike that a major quality gap existed between the IDF and Arab forces. Exponents of this argument put forth a strong case, based mainly on previous Arab-Israeli wars, to the effect that the Israeli Air Force and armored units were far superior

to their Arab counterparts. Previous experiences were based on air encounters and armored contacts when Israel generally had the advantage of surprise and initiative.

When Israel did manage to take the initiative in 1973, after an Arab surprise attack, the cost to Israel in lives and weapons strained its resources to the limit. The reasons for the initial Egyptian and Syrian success were a combination of modern technology, surprise attack, well-defined objectives and better coordination of fighting systems, superior to anything that they had been able to demonstrate or deploy in previous encounters.

Several Israeli analysts summed up, somewhat paradoxically, that the Arab armies demonstrated an ability, given the right conditions, to make sophisticated use of a relatively crude capability; whereas the IDF, under the impact of surprise, demonstrated, in the initial stages of the War, a clumsy use of sophisticated capability.[27] Since Soviet and French arms supplies are readily available to the Arabs, there is reason to believe that Arab capabilities, in terms of equipment, readiness, and training will continue to improve. Thus, from the Israeli perspective, future conflicts will have to be approached differently.

In this context, Egyptian and Syrian achievments vis-a-vis Israel in the war for air supremacy are now analyzed as a whole, including SAM and ATG missiles, conventional and radar-directed AA fire, ECM, ECCM, and use of the air force.[28] Here it must be noted that in U.S.S.R., as well as in Syria, the AA defense has its own

organic units of the air force. Attempts to analyze Arab air capabilities
in detail, such as comparisons of Israeli dog fight capabilities, or
that many planes were lost to conventional fire rather than to missiles
may miss the basic point.[29]

At the beginning of the 1973 War, it seems as if the IAF was in
a crisis. The Arab attack appeared to catch a number of units unprepared
for the kind of warfare they were expected to conduct. Further, the
level of coordination between the Syrians and Egyptians strained
the IAF to the utmost. As IAF losses mounted, it became increasingly
difficult to keep air force priorities in order.[30]

Since the essence of surprise attack is that the victim is
denied the time needed for a reasonable choice of priorities, the IAF
had to buy time in the Golan Heights while general IDF mobilization
proceeded and concurrently change its target priorities on the Egyptian
front. During this period, the IDF's agility proved to be of diminished
value against heavy deployment of sophisticated AA systems.

The need to contain the Syrian tank columns made the IAF vulnerable
to the AA belts, which it had not time and insufficient resources to
deal with at this stage. Guided by the philosophy that the Egyptians
had to be stopped at the Suez Canal, the IAF attacked bridgeheads and
exposed its aircraft to defense systems designed precisely for this
purpose. Here the accuracy of the SA-6 was a little known phenomenon,
as was the abundance of all types of missiles and the extensive use
made of them. Thus in trying to avoid the missiles, Israeli Air
Froce planes fell victim to the ZSU-23-4 mm. guns. Here the Israeli

Air Force was fighting a total system of which the "dog fight" was only one component.

Similarly, Arab armored units employed a total system concept. The Sagger anti-tank missiles were indeed lethal, as was the profuse use of RPG's by masses of infantry, yet it was the combination of these weapons with anti-tank emplacements and tank gun fire which has led some specialists to conclude that the tank, as a weapons system, has a limited future in the Middle East.[31] Thus, it is felt that, given improved Arab capability, new weapons and tactics will have to be developed by the IDF to cure the increased vulnerability of tanks.

Thus, a preliminary analysis of the War led some Israeli observers to believe that the anti-tank missile had succeeeded in driving the tank out of the battlefield, while subsequent analyses revealed that tank guns and conventional anti-tank fire had also taken a serious toll, and qualified the preliminary assumptions, as well as Israeli evaluations of Egyptians and Syrian tank capability.

It is felt that, given improved Arab capabilities, new weapons and tactics will have to be developed by the IDF to cure the vulnerability of tanks in an anti-tank missile environment. It is equally important, however, for Israel to find a solution to future armed warfare on a battlefield where missiles' targeted areas restrict the movement of armored vehicles and expose them to other means of destruction.

Limited objectives of the Egyptian forces also contributed to the disadvantage of IDF armored units, which faced masses of RPG armed infantry.

Political considerations are, however, part and parcel of warfare, and here Israel will, in any future rounds of general warfare, be forced to fight an improved Arab capability combined with Soviet military philosophy. Such political considerations may become an integral part of future wars on the tactical, as well as the operational and strategic levels.

Additional Israeli concern has arisen over the arming of the PLO with increasingly advanced weapons, such as anti-tank and SAM missiles. Further, CoS Gur has pointed to the potential danger of direct intervention by Saudi Arabia in future rounds of warfare, thus adding to the combined Arab military capability.[32]

Arab attitudes: Less consensus exists among Israelis over current Arab attitudes toward settlement. By and large the present leadership still views the Arabs as dedicated to the ultimate elimination of Israel as a Jewish State.

Premier Yitzhak Rabin:

> What (Sadat) considers to be the (Palestinians') legitimate rights is, practically, the annihilation and destruction of a Jewish and independent state. Therefore what Sadat says is that he is ready to make peace with an Israel that does not exist.[33]

Moshe Dayan (former Defense Minister):

> It is very difficult. . .for any Arab country to sign an agreement with Israel. This can be done only under the pressure of war, or when Israel occupies Arab territories, as was the case during the Yom Kippur War.[34]

Aharon Yariv (former Information Minister):

> (The Arabs) do not distinguish between policy and propa-
> ganda, between intentions and deceptions. They talk of
> peace while placing $10 billion dollars worth of orders
> for arms; they talk of a return to the 1967 borders, if
> those; they talk of justice for the Palestinians and mean
> the destruction of Israel.[35]

Beyond the present political and military leadership some changes

in the Arab attitudes are receiving notice, and some Israeli leaders

have called for a reassessment of policy in light of these.

> Recently. . .the Egyptians have been speaking with so many
> voices and have been saying so many contradictory things,
> that one must conclude that. . .the Egyptian decision-
> making process entered a new phase. . .
>
> In the longer term, the important factor may turn out
> to be that the political public (in Egypt) has become more
> sharply aware than hitherto of the inherent contradiction
> between a forward, activist, all-Arab policy and 'the
> improvement of our own circumstances'. If circumstances
> are judged to be improbable, the trend may be towards some
> disengagement from what is called 'the Arab cause'; if
> the social and economic problems come to be seen as intract-
> able, the glories of pan-Arab leadership (to be purchased
> in anti-Israel currency) may again become the method of
> directing attention away from them.[36]

2.4 INTERNAL PARAMETERS

Introduction

The final set of policy constraints that shape and limit the potential flexibility of Israeli policy are the internal parameters of the decision-making environment. In large measure these internal parameters are composed of those centrifugal, or societal, forces and other considerations emanating within Israel which serve to limit the security and settlement options open to the Israeli leadership.

Included in this set of parameters are domestic politics, which play an important role in both day-to-day and long range policy considerations; military and other security factors, which serve to limit the range of options open to the Israeli leadership; and economic, social and religious factors, which serve to influence Israeli leadership.

Domestic Politics

The basic positions of the various political parties have been covered in Part One above. Considered here are specific positions taken by the parties indicating the thrust of a given group's policy, the influence they have attempted to exert, and their flexibility.

The Alignment: Although the Labor Alignment leads the government coalition, it is not possible to ascribe a single policy position to either the group as a whole, or its leadership in general. The far reaching public debate over security and settlement policy has split the Alignment, as well as the factions which compose it.

At present four major aspects of the security-settlement issue provide the basis for division and debate within the Alignment, as well as the Likud and other minor opposition parties:[37]

(a) What should be Israel's overall approach to settlement, including final borders, at a Geneva conference;

(b) What strategic positions and territories Israel can concede as part of another interim agreement;

(c) Whether Israel should negotiate directly with the P.L.O.;

(d) Whether a government of national unity, which includes the opposition parties, should be formed.

Here it must be noted that the divisions are not represented by coherent groups. For example, Shimon Peres and Abba Eban hold a common view that Israel should move directly to Geneva, but differ over what concessions they favor. The major backer of the Kissinger approach within the Cabinet appears to be Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, with Premier Rabin taking a middle course, tending toward the Allon line.

One indication of the sharp divisions within the Cabinet is the recent resignation of Information Minister Aharon Yariv. Yariv cited a number of reasons for his departure, including the belief that Israeli interest would be better served at Geneva rather than by additional interim concessions; that Israel ought to negotiate directly with the P.L.O.; and that needed decision-making reforms ought to be implemented. By one report:

> . . .Mr. Yariv was disturbed by the danger that Israel may be pressured by the U.S. into giving up territory without any meaningful Egyptian concession in return. He was said to have been working on a proposal that should be submitted to Dr. Kissinger for a deep Israeli withdrawal in Sinai that

would have to be accompanied by equally significant
Egyptian political concessions. However, this was
blocked by his inability to obtain a hearing in the
Cabinet.[38]

Although no other defections from the CAbinet have occurred,

divisions remain which limit the flexibility of the Rabin Government.

Specifically, the existing coalition does not appear to have

sufficient support to reach an overall settlement at Geneva. At present,

the coalition would appear to have sufficient internal and public

support to negotiate second stage agreements with Egypt and Syria,

although insufficient support to reach an overall settlement as the

Government is presently composed.

If a second stage interim agreement involves return of the Mitlin

and Gidi passes, as well as the Abu Rhodeis oil field, there is a

reasonable probability that such an agreement will fail to win Knesset

approval.

Within the Alignment a dovish group of some 20 to 22 MK's,

calling itself the "Free Platform" has threatened to disintegrate

the coalition. Originally founded to oppose formation of a national

unity government, this group has reacted strongly to Premier Rabin's

recent public statements, and has urged a more flexible approach to

settlement. Such a splinter has evoked strong reaction from both the

Alignment leadership, and the opposition Likud and NRP as well. The

net effect of this division has been to force the center of the Alignment

closer to Likud.[39]

In recent weeks the policy of this dovish faction has become more clearly defined. In the main, it would seek a settlement at Geneva roughly along the lines of the old "Rogers plan," or roughly along the 4 June 1967 boundaries with minor modifications. Mentioned as possible leaders have been former Foreign Minister Eban, former Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, and the present leadership of the Mapam wing of the Alignment. While such a coalition would have the flexibility to reach a settlement with the Arab states, it would be unlikely to have either widespread Knesset or public support.

A more viable alternative would be a new coalition centered around the pragmatic Rafi wing of the Alignment. At present two possibilities exist. First, after new elections former Defense Minister Dayan could assume a position of leadership in a Rafi - led coalition, including the opposition Likud and rightist elements of the Labor party. Such a possibility must, however, be largely discounted. As one Rafi MK recently stated:

> The only issue which could split Labour and bring elements of Rafi, the Likud and NRP to combine would be Judea and Samaria.[40]

Second, and more likely, is a Rafi-dominated coalition led by Defense Minister Peres. Unscathed by the failings of the 1973 War, Peres attained the key position of Defense Minister. There he has managed to steer clear of major political infighting and has largely turned his attention to the postwar rebuilding of the IDF.

Following the fall of the present government, or in new elections,

Peres would be in a position to form a pragmatic Rafi-centered government that would have sufficient flexibility, as well as Knesset and public support to negotiate and implement settlement. Although Mapam and the far left would most likely refuse to join such a government, they would be pressed to support any settlement it might reach.[41]

Divisions with the opposition: As discussed, the basic position of Likud is in line with that of the Rabin government. At its last annual convention (January 1975), the Likud leadership put forth no real alternative plan other than Begin's call for a three year truce and negotiation of settlement issues. Begin has explicitly supported Prime Minister Rabin stating that the Prime Minister's statement

> . . . gave the lie to those who seek to divide the
> nation into two groups -- of those supposedly espousing
> peace and others who are war mongers -- because what Mr.
> Rabin said (in response to a speech by Egyptian Presi-
> dent Sadat) is exactly what we have been saying all along.[42]

Despite attempts by some Likud leaders to turn this opposition bloc into a unified party, an opposite trend appears to be in progress. The present security situation has produced additional fractionalization and internal division, reflecting the same policy divisions that also pervade the alignment.

In part this division represents a rejection of the established leadership of Menahem Begin, Chaim Landau and others of the "old guard", but, more importantly, a group is emerging that favors a more active and pragmatic approach to settlement policy.[43]

Indicative of the split is the recent departure from <u>Likud</u> of

Dr. Binsymin Halevi, a former Israeli Supreme Court Justice, and <u>Knesset</u>

member, who has urged that the "situation obliges Israel to agree in

principle to compromises, and attempt to de-escalate the (Arab-Israeli)

dispute".

> They (<u>Herut</u>) loathe the word compromise.... but peace
> without compromise is not possible. Likud policies
> would bring Israel into head on collisions with friends
> as well as foes.[44]

One veteran political observer views Dr. Halevi's departure as

demonstrating a growing concern in <u>Likud</u> about policy flexibility:

> If not in <u>Herut</u>, then certainly within the <u>Likud</u>, there
> are those who are disquieted by the situation, but feel
> unable to do much about it. The threat of splitting up
> the Likud would not move Mr. Begin from his fixed posi-
> tions, but could wreck its rather grey components at the
> polls.
>
> Dr. Halevi's sharp critique of <u>Herut</u>'s 'unrealistic
> policy' is not likely therefore to make any dent either
> in <u>Herut</u> or the <u>Likud</u>. However, this does not diminish
> the virtue of his willingness to publicly reject his
> party policies -- and accept the consequences.[45]

Additional evidence of division comes from <u>Likud</u>'s Free Center

faction which has split recently with a four man faction denouncing

the dovish views expressed by Free Center chairman Shmuel Tamir.

Tamir has advocated a policy more flexible than the <u>Likud</u> mainstream

> We are a pragmatic party, in the mainstream favouring
> compromises for real peace between the maximalist stand
> of not budging one inch and the minimalist readiness
> to agree to unilateral withdrawals without achieving peace.[46]

Together the Halevi-Tamir pragmatism reflects a growing potential for the flexibility required to achieve a viable settlement. They and their backers are likely to support a policy based on withdrawal in exchange for peace, given reasonable assurances of Israeli security.

Divisions within the minor parties: As is the case with the Alignment and Likud, Israel's minor parties are similarly afflicted with policy divisions. Within the NRP, the split is two dimensional; along both policy and generational lines. The old guard, led by Minister Burg, Raphael, and Hazani support the policy of the present Alignment leadership, while the NRP's "young guard", joined by Dr. Zorah Warhaftig, seek to alter incumbent leadership.

To a major extent the split within the NRP reflects sharp division over party leadership and issues not directly related to security and settlement questions. However, the extent to which this division may affect government flexibility in negotiations still depends upon the proposed disposition of Judea and Samaria. The NRP demands with regard to these territories are not, however, capable of determining policy.

Finally, Ya'ad and the parties of the far left have encouraged direct negotiations and compromise settlement. Here Mrs. Aloni of Ya'ad has recently stated her belief that "Egypt sought peace and urged recognition of the Palestinian entity."

Military Factors

Central to Israeli policy-making are perceptions of the strategic
situation. While the security problem posed by the pre-1967 borders
has been discussed, it is important to note some of the military problems
that curtail policy flexibility both in the absence of a general
settlement and on an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders.

It is present Israeli policy to accept withdrawal from
substantially all occupied territories in return for a "peace" based
on a mutual declaration of non-belligerency. Withdrawal would, ceteris
paribus, put Israel in the same strategic position that existed prior
to the 1967 war, and thus vulnerable to a coordinated attack.

Current Israeli thinking holds that a war under such circum-
stances is winnable, although at an extremely high cost. This cost
is, in turn, discounted by the sharply reduced probability of another
war. What must be kept in mind is that, given the 1967 borders, the
stronger Israel's defensive posture and the lower the probability of
war, the more flexible will be Israel's policy toward settlement.

Additional problems on both tactical and strategic levels are
raised for Israeli security under a proposed interim agreement in
the absence of a general settlement. By yielding the Mitla and Gidi
passes in Sinai, for example, Israel would be confronted with a
desert border in excess of 400 km. A general war under such circum-
stances would present major tactical and defensive problems, and would
be certain to take a far higher toll than under present disengagement

lines, although the bulk of Egyptian positions would still be within range of Israeli missile systems.

The strategic situation vis-a-vis Egypt is illustrated in Maps 1 and 2. A mid-Sinai disengagement such as that illustrated in Map 1 shows that areas with substantial deployment of Egyptian weapons are within range of Israeli Jericho missile, which could, presumably, be armed with nuclear devices.

Upon withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 borders (Map 2), the same situation prevails, with the exception of Aswan.

The strategic situation in the central and northern sectors is illustrated in Map 3. Here it is noted that, even following a withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 borders, virtually all of Syria and Jordan are within range of current Israeli missile capability.

On a tactical level, however, the military problem posed by the Syrian re-occupation of the Golan, and an Arab armed force on the West Bank is again imposing. Defending against new attacks from these positions would be a formidable task. Thus, the IDF has sought to make demilitarization of these crucial areas a part of any settlement.

Another problem is presented by continuous terrorist activity in the absence of negotitations or a settlement with the Palestinians. Here, the IDF believes that the key to control of terrorist forces is and will continue to be the exercise froce over the host nations. In a state of non-belligerency it is believed that such activites can be brought under control, but if no, the Israeli attitude is that expressed by Defense Minister Peres:

(MID-SINAI DISENGAGEMENT LINE)

Israel held land

Salum

Alexandria

Cairo

El Fayum

Asyut

Port Said

Suez

Aswan

300

mi.

Tel-Aviv

Gaza

El Arish

E-lath

Aqaba

Sharm el Sheik

Beersheba

Jerusalem

Amman

Medina

Mecca

BORDERS OF 4 JUNE 1967

Mecca

Medina

Amman
Jerusalem
Beersheba
E'lath
P Aqaba
Sharm el Shikh
Tel-Aviv
Gaza
El Arish
Port Said
Suez
Aswan
Cairo
El Fayum
Asyut
Alexandria
300 ml.
Selum

MAP 3

BORDERS FOLLOWING THE 1967 WAR

Israeli held land

Mosul

Baghdad

Basra

Al Kuwait

300 mi.

Aleppo

Hama

Homs

Damascus

Amman

Beirut

Tel Aviv

What is the Israeli answer?. . . Will we allow (the
Arabs) to bring all this might to the borders of
Israel to threaten us while their lands, their oil,
their cities and airfields remain secure? Or should
Israel say that he who threatens it will be subject to
threat? Those who wish to concentrate their armies
against us will be forced to deploy their armies in
their own countries to defend their own land.[47]

Here Peres sets forth a massive retaliation policy, not only
with regard to the major confrontation states of Egypt and Syria, but
also the non-confrontation states of "Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya and
others" as well. Nevertheless, such a defense policy, supported by
systems to make it credible, would appear to give the political
leadership the military flexibility necessary to reach a negotiated
settlement.

Economic Factors

As previously indicated, a major problem for Israeli policy-
makers stems from Israel's chronic economic problems, including
large balance-of-payments deficits and massive defense expenditures.
While the immediate economic impact of a negoitated settlement would
be minimal, it is generally felt that over time a negotiated settlement
would reduce the demands placed on the economy for defense, and that
an end to the Arab boycott and possible trade relations would have a
positive effect on the Israeli economy.

2.5 SETTLEMENT ISSUES AND OPTIONS

Introduction

Given the societal and centrifugal forces which serve to shape
and limit Israeli policy, it is possible to raise the questions of
what options are available to the Israeli leadership and how they
are perceived. Here, it must be noted that, under the present decision-
making scheme, the various options have not been fully analyzed by
either the leadership, the political parties or the other societal
groups. As indicated, policy-making since the 1973 War has been
ad hoc in character, with little consideration given to systematic
analysis of alternatives or contingency planning.[48]

Flexibility in existing policy is rarely expressed. Likewise,
the major political parties and other groups talk in slogans and
cliches rather than concrete proposals.

Even the opposition Likud has failed to set forth substantive
alternatives, other than the suggestion of a three year truce during
which settlement negotiations could take place.

Whether of not current negotiations produce a second interim
agreement, on disengagement, it appears that the parties will most
likely move successive negotiations to the Geneva setting. At this
point, the Israelis will be forced to turn their attention to the
substantive problems and options of an overall settlement with the
Arab states.[49]

Geographic Parameters

As discussed, the issue of borders has received considerable attention by the Israeli leadership as well as the general public. In a settlement, which would include a statement of non-belligerancy by the major Arab powers, virtually all groups in Israel have expressed a willingness to accept borders similar to those of 4 June 1967.

Sinai and the Gaza Strip: Premier Rabin has repeatedly stated Israel's willingness to return almost all of Sinai "in exchange for a genuine peace."[50] The one condition he has attached is that Israel be allowed to maintain a "presence and control" at Sharm el-Sheikh. This demand has taken the form of a land link to Israel, but could probably be met by granting use of the new Eilat-Sharm el-Sheikh road that Israel has constructed. Since the Arabs were able to close off Eilat at Bab al-Mandeb in the 1973 War, it appears that an Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh does not hold the same strategic and economic importance to Israel it did in the years prior to that war.

Various individuals have expressed a desire that upon return, the Sinai be largely demilitarized, or Arab forces limited, but the present Israeli leadership has not irrevocably committed itself on this question.

Last, it would appear to be the Israeli desire that Gaza return to Egyptian sovereignty. To the extent that it would be incorporated into a new Palestinian entity, the question is relevant to settlement of the Palestinian problem, which Israelis have thus far not addressed directly.

West Bank territories: Israel is willing to accept return of
the West Bank either to Jordanian administration or the established
West Bank leadership under a federation, but the majority of the
Israeli leadership and populace dismiss the idea of turning it
over to the Palestinians (PLO). Alternate views on Jewish settle-
ment in the West Bank have been offered by Premier Rabin, who presently
favors restricting such settlement to areas such as Hebron, and Moshe
Dayan, who does not propose annexation, but a more liberal policy
toward settlement.

Only the NRP actively advocates direct annexation of any West
Bank territories, particularly Judea and Samaria. However, it is
doubtful that NRP could influence a final settlement in this regard.

Finally, Defense Minister Peres has suggested three possibilities:

(a) Division of the "Biblical" land between Israel and Jordan;

(b) An Israeli-Jordanian federation;

(c) A common market on the European model.[51]

Although Peres favors a federative or common market approach,
both retain the assumption of Jordanian sovereignty and refuse to
recognize an independent Palestinian entity.

Golan Heights: A more serious problem appears over return of
the Golan Heights. First, Israel has yet to overcome serious reser-
vations about the security of northern Israel given a return of the
Heights to Syria. Secondly, Israeli settlements in the Golan since
occupation in 1967 present political problems for the government in
negotiating its return.

Pressure from the Kibbutzim (on the left) and the Likud (on the right) severely limit the government's ability to negotiate a total withdrawal from the area. Further, as the government is presently composed, it is unlikely that such a withdrawal could be negotiated and subsequently approved in the Knesset.

Jerusalem: A special problem is raised by the status of Israeli occupied East Jerusalem, particularly the holy places of the Old City. Here the government, as well as opposition and religious groups, have expressed a determination not to return control of Jewish holy places to the Arabs' control.

While options such as internationalization are discussed abroad, they are not yet actively considered in Israel. It can only be hoped that as negotiations proceed, flexibility on this issue will develop.

The Palestinian Problem

Since the accession of the Rabin government in 1974, there has been little change in the established policy of refusing to recognize or negotiate with the P.L.O. Evidence of minor change comes from Defense Minister Peres, who has recently noted a more moderate stance by Yassir Arafat, although in form, not content.

> As far as the Palestinian people are concerned, two other parties are better equipped to negotiate: the King of Jordan, and the local leaders of the West Bank.[52]

This statement and others have raised the possibility of a West Bank referendum and negotiations with established leaders, such as

King Hussein, as agents of the Palestinian people. The Israeli leadership has devoted considerable effort towards developing working relationships with the present West Bank leadership and holds considerable hope, despite Rabat, that these relationships will be the basis for accommodation.[53]

As noted, support exists within Israel for direct negotiations with the P.L.O. as the only realistic way to approach the Palestinian problem. Support comes from the left, the Foreign Ministry, and even from a number of leaders on the right. Should a policy shift take place, it is likely to have some support within key publics and the population as a whole.

Weapons Systems

Although not an option in the true sense of the word, it is clear that Israeli policy will be largely affected by the continued availability of advanced weapons systems which serve to stabilize the arms balance in the area and reduce Israeli dependence on terri- torial buffers for security. To the extent that Israeli security, and the leadership's perception of security needs, can be maintained in any territory-for-technology tradeoff, policy flexibility will be increased.

Ultimate return of the occupied territories, and settlement on the 4 June 1967 borders, will depend on the Israeli conviction that these are defensible and an ability to maintain Israel's strategic posture vis-a-vis the Arab states. In the view of Defense Minister

Peres, the belief that "in the foreseeable future Israel would be able to maintain the present military balance of one to three with the Arab states" seems to provide this.[54]

In the Israeli view, such capability is a function of both conventional forces, SRBM's and IAF ability to carry out deep interdictive strikes in Arab territory. To the extent that advanced weapons systems such as Lance missiles, ECM, and other systems maintain this capability and technical superiority over the Arab forces, Israel's military and political leadership (particularly those with military backgrounds) will take a more flexible view of interim concessions, as well as final settlement lines.

International Guarantees

As mentioned, Israel views with skepticism the ability of the United Nations to keep the peace. In the absence of superpower guarantees, any U.N. efforts are likely to be totally discounted.

Underwritten by the superpowers, however, recognition and guarantee of final settlement lines will provide the Israeli leadership with both the confidence they need to accept such lines, and the ability to gain popular and Knesset support and approval.

Optimally, both the United States and the Soviet Union, as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference, would recognize any settlement reached by the parties and guarantee the inviolability of settlement lines and borders. Offensive action by either side in violation of these lines would then consitute a causus belli.

Superpower action in such an event could range from direct action to a cutoff of military supplies to the party in violation. Perhaps initially and as a sign of good faith, a joint Soviet-American peace keeping force might be placed in the area.

Here it is important to note that a priori, the stronger the commitment of the superpowers to underwriting and enforcing an agreed upon settlement, the greater the negotiating flexibility of both the Arab states and Israel.

Economic and Other Incentives

A final category of settlement elements are those economic, social and cultural factors which could become part of a settlement and reduce the uncertainty and hostility between Israelis and Arabs, thus increasing the stability of the area.

Mentioned in this regard have been the following, although this is not an exhaustive list:

(a) An end to the economic boycott of Israel by Egypt and other Arab states and the beginning of a trading relationship. The basis for such a relationship could be present economic ties with the West Bank community, or direct export of Israeli agricultural technology to Egypt, along the model of the United States and China (CPR).

(b) An end to the political boycott of Israel, whereby Egypt accepts some form of political relationship with Israel, such as exchanging "interest sections" in third country embassies. This possiblity is not, however, viewed as likely, or important as the beginning of economic relationships.

(c) Demilitarization, or minimally reduced military presence, in the lands returned to Arab sovereignty.

(d) Free Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal or agreement that Israeli cargo pass through on third country ships.

(e) Direct air connections for third country airliners.

(f) Direct mail and telephone communications.

(g) Cultural and sports exchange. Included here is an Egyptian willingness to allow Egyptian players and teams to compete against Israel in international competitions.

(h) Reciprocal visits by Israeli and Arab journalists, such as permission for an Israeli news representative to return Egyptian Sana Hassan's recent visit to Israel.

To the extent that any of these achievements can be accomplished, they will most certainly serve to further reduce both the tension and uncertainty that exist between the parties to the Middle East conflict, and broaden the basis for a genuine and lasting peace.

NOTES

PART TWO

1. Rosenne, "Basic Elements of Israel's Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 335.

2. Sara Honig, "Peres: Soviets Still Giving Egypt Weapons," _Jerusalem Post_, 22 Janurary 1975, p. 1.

3. See A. Rabinovich, "Dr. Goldmann: Chances now for Full Peace with the Arabs," _Jerusalem Post_, 25 January 1975.

4. Rosenne, op. cit., pp. 356-357; United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949; Resolutions of 19 October, 4 November, and 16 November 1948; and documents S/1044, S/1070, S/1080, and Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.

5. See, for example, David Ben-Gurion, "Israel's Position Before and After the (1956) Sinai Campaign," _Israel Government Yearbook, 5720_ (Jerusalem: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 9-87.

6. Moshe Dayan, "Israel's Border and Security Problems," _Foreign Affairs_, 33 (January 1955), p. 250.

7. _Jerusalem Post_, 15 January 1975, p. 8.

8. Interview with G. Lev-Ari, broadcast on Israeli radio 18 January 1975 Reported in FBIS, 18 January 1975.

9. _Jerusalem Post_, 10 January 1975, p. 2.

10. Interview with Terrence Smith, _The New York Times_, 15 February 1975.

11. See Brecher, _The Foreign Policy System of Israel_, op. cit.

12. See Peres, _Davis's Sling_, op. cit.

13. Quoted in the _Jerusalem Post_, 19 January 1975, p. 3.

14. Shimon Peres, interview in _Die Welt_ (Bonn), 25 January 1975, reprinted (in English) in the _Jerusalem Post_, 26 January 1975, p. 1.

15. _Ha'aretz_ (in Hebrew), 13 January 1975, p. 8.

16. The statement attributed to Mrs. Meir, in response to CoS Elazar's request for a pre-emptive strike has been reported as:

> This time it has to be crystal clear who began, so we
> won't have to go around the world convincing people
> that our cause is just.

Terrence Smith, "Israeli Errors on Eve of War Emerging," The New York Times, 10 December 1973, pp. 1, 18.

17. Interview with Terrence Smith, The New York Times, 8 January 1975.

18. Quoted in the Jerusalem Post, 15 January 1975, p. 2.

19. For an extensive analysis of this role, see R. D. McLaurin and Mohammed Mughisuddin, The Soviet Union in the Middle East (Washington: American Institutes for Research, October 1974).

20. Interview with M. Robertson, Christian Broadcasting Network, Associated Press transcript published in the Jerusalem Post, 13 January 1975.

21. Quoted in the Jerusalem Post, 22 January 1975, p. 1.

22. Quoted in Rabinovich, op. cit., p. 3.

23. Ibid.

24. See Amnon Sella, "Limits of Soviet Seapower," Jerusalem Post Magazine, 10 January 1975; Amnon Sella, "Soviet Training and Arab Performance," Jerusalem Post Magazine, 8 February 1974. Dr. Sella has also made available to the author the manuscripts of two unpublished papers, "Soviet Military Doctrine in the October War," (January 1974) and "The Soviet Union in the Middle East" (May 1974).

25. See Arthur Lall, The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (rev. ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

26. See Part One, Note 5, above. See also, Wagner (1974:1), op. cit.

27. See N. Dunevitz, "Sinai: Heroism During the First Days, " Ha'aretz (in Hebrew), 10 October 1973, p. 11; A. Dolev, "Bamaoz shelo nafal," Ma'ariv (in Hebrew), 14 December 1973, p. 25; U. Benzimen, "Netsurim bamaozim," Ha'aretz (in Hebrew), 9 November 1973, pp. 21-25; Z. Schiff, Ha'aretz (in Hebrew), 2 November 1973, p. 7; Agranat Commission Report, op. cit.

28. See Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22 October 1973, 3 December 1973, pp. 17-19, and Insight Team of the Sunday Times (London), Insight on the Middle East War (London: 1974).

29. This point has been made by M/G Benjamin Peled, IAF. Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, March 1975.

30. <u>Insight on the Middle East War</u>, op. cit., p. 85.

31. See, for example, V. Thompson, "Lessons of the Yom Kippur War," <u>Ma'ariv</u> (in Hebrew), 18 February 1974, p. 5, and Z. Schiff, "Men Against Tanks," <u>Ha'aretz</u> (in Hebrew), 4 November 1973, p. 5.

32. Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, IDF CoS, interview on IDF radio, 10 January 1975. Reported in FBIS, 11 January 1975.

33. Quoted in the <u>Jerusalem Post</u>, 26 January 1975, p. 1.

34. Speech at Bar-Ilan University, 26 January 1975.

35. Quoted in the <u>Jerusalem Post</u>, 30 January 1975, p. 8.

36. Daniel Dishon, "Sadat's Time for Decision," <u>Jerusalem Post Magazine</u>, 24 January 1975, pp. 5,7.

37. To this list, a fifth point might be added, which is whether Israel should implement the decision-making reforms advocated by such leaders as Aharon Yariv, Gad Ya'acobi, Mordechai Gazit and others. This problem is considered at some length in Abraham R. Wagner, <u>Formation of an Israeli NSC</u>, Memorandum prepared for the Office of the Prime Minister (Israel), March 1974.

38. See Terrence Smith, "Yariv Resigns Israeli Information Post," <u>The New York Times</u>, 30 January 1975, p. 2, and "Yariv Quits Post," and "Yariv's Resignation," (editorial), <u>Jerusalem Post</u>, 30 January 1975, pp. 1,8.

39. See Mark Segal, "Collapse Feared of Labour Knesset Faction," <u>Jerusalem Post</u>, 6 January 1975, p. 1.

40. Asher Wallfish, "Rabin Told: Watch Out for Dayan!," <u>Jerusalem Post</u>, 21 January 1975, p. 1.

41. Again the analogy to the situation in the United States, of obtaining Democratic support for the Republican Administration's opening with China (CPR) in 1970 is applicable here.

42. Menachem Begin, Address before the WIZO Assembly, Tel-Aviv, 27 January 1975.

43. See S. Shapiro, "Hebron Convention Marks Deep Departure from Herut Traditions," <u>Jerusalem Post</u>, 19 January 1975, p. 3.

44. Quoted in <u>Ha'aretz</u> (in Hebrew), 2 January 1975, p. 1.

45. Lea Ben-Dor, "Dr. Halevi's Exit," (editorial), <u>Jerusalem Post</u>, 2 January 1975, p. 8.

46. Quoted in the _Jerusalem Post_, 25 January 1975, p. 1.

47. Interview in _Shehakim_ (in Hebrew) (Israel Aircraft Industries Newsletter), January 1975.

48. Brecher, _op. cit._, p. 136.

49. See Terrence Smith, "A Debate for Israelis: What Path to Peace?," _The New York Times_, 16 January 1975, p. 2.

50. See, for example, interview with Y. Cuau, _Le Figaro_ (in French), 9 January 1975.

51. See note 14 above.

52. Interview in _Newsweek_, 14 January 1975.

53. See Richard H. Ullmen, "After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles," _Foreign Affairs_ (January 1975), pp. 284-296.

54. Quoted in the _Jerusalem Post_, 16 January 1975.

PART THREE

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Perspectives for American Policy

In its dual role as Israel's principal arms supplier and agent
for securing a settlement in the Middle East, the United States
faces a complex set of demands, parameters and constraints. It is
clear that any American policy must deal with a set of interrelated
internal and external parameters highly subject to societal forces,
both in the United States and Israel.

While the impact of domestic forces on United States policy has
not been the subject of the present research, it is nevertheless impor-
tant to note the key role that they play. However, it has been
argued that certain key publics in Israel influence policy and play
a central role in determining the demands placed on the United States
and the flexibility open to Israeli policy-makers.[1]

American policy necessarily consists of a number of interrelated
elements which can be individually varied to achieve the ultimate
policy objectives.[2] Major elements of United States policy have been
political support, military assistance and economic aid.

Examining United States political support for Israel, it is
important to note that, since the 1967 Six Day War, Washington has
sought to distinguish between Israel's territorial conquests and its
right to exist as a state.[3] While the American commitment to Israel's
basic existence as a fundamental tenet of American policy has not been
seriously questioned since 1969, the nature and extent of United States

support for continued occupation of Arab lands is very much an issue.[4]

American policy with respect to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, however, presents some room for maneuver. Under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the United States is able to support the return of the occupied territories within the context of an overall settlement.[5] The speed and context within which the U.S. poses for such return constitutes a major lever over Israeli policy.

As Israel's principal arms supplier, the United States is in a position subject to a host of strategic and political consider- ations, to set some basic parameters for military aid to Israel, with sufficient lattitude for this supply effort to be utilized for influence on Israeli policy.

Closely related to military assistance are the options presented by American economic aid to Israel. In light of the serious economic situation within Israel, which is both an internal one and one related to the general Middle East conflict, the United States is in a position to exercise some influence over settlement conditions through economic means. Through careful development and structuring of an overall economic policy for the Middle East, the U.S. may be able to both promise a peaceful settlement, and at the same time provide the basis for reducing tension and providing for lasting security within the region.

Beyond these basis elements, any effective U.S. policy in the Middle East must consider a set of additional incentives, assurances

and catalysts which can be employed to effect a settlement among the parties and increase the security of the region.

In undertaking such an analysis and assessment, it is necessary for United States policy-makers to bear in mind the vital and pressing need for effective policy in this area. Looming over the failure to formulate and implement such policy on a timely basis is the real spectre of renewed war on a major scale and an increase in Soviet influence and prestige throughout the area.

Avenues for Influence

While the present analysis recognizes the integral relationship of U.S. policy to the entire Middle East, the major focal point in the present analysis is on Israel and Israeli policy-making. Building on the framework of a rational choice process in determining policy, the present considers those elements in Israel's leadership and key publics which influence policy and which are potentially subject to American influence.

The first, as well as the most obvious, avenue for American influence is through the present Israeli leadership. As mentioned, the political and military leadership are necessarily responsive to American actions in key areas. Several members of Israel's leadership are sensitized to even the most minute changes in American support of their espoused policy. Often, even existing U.S. commitments in alternative terms have given rise to speculation in both Israeli government circles and the press. While publicly resigned to "go it alone" in the

end, most Israeli leaders privately admit their apprehension over a possible shift or loss of American support.[6]

Basic elements of this political support are generally seen to be the following:

(a) Support of Israel's right to exist, within secure and recognized borders.

(b) Israel's right to continued occupation of the "territories" in lieu of Arab recognition and non-belligerency.

(c) Use of American influence, and veto if necessary, to block severe anti-Israeli action in the United Nations.

(d) Use of American influence with third parties to mitigate the impact of anti-Israel programs such as the Arab economic boycott.

While the United States is committed to supporting each of these interests to a greater or lesser extent, at least the nature and force given to implementation offers considerable room for maneuver.

A second method of exerting influence over the Israeli leadership and policy-making is through the level of military support. In the wake of the March 1975 Kissinger mission, this support has received an increasing amount of attention in both the American and Israeli press as well as in government circles.[7]

It is crucial to note, however, that the relationship between weapons supply and policy flexibility is a complex one, and may be counterproductive. That is, decreasing arms supplies will not necessarily increase flexibility over a broad range of issues. Still, when

carefully utilized, it appears that the level of military support can be an effective policy tool.

Beyond the political and military factors, some indirect and alternative methods of influence exist. Worth mention is the fact that, since 1973, Israel has become sensitive to the developing relationship between the United States and the Arab states. Here the form and substance of these relationships can have an impact on Israeli policy. Likewise, the evolving U.S.-Soviet detente is not without its impact on Israel's policy and planning, although it becomes difficult for the United States to manipulate the latter as easily as other policy tools.

An Overview of American Options

Following closely from the demands placed on the United States and the avenues open for influence over Israel's policy is the set of alternative options open to U.S. policy planners. In considering any policy options, or set of options, it is necessary to bear in mind that at any given point overall policy consists of a mix of non-exlusive options. What follows, are some of the basic options in the principal policy areas presently open to American policy-makers.

Political Options: As a practical matter, the major political options presently available to the United States appear to be the following:

(a) Direct pressure on the present Israeli leadership to increase their policy flexibility, either through change in its position, or through alternative government formulations;

(b) Encouragement of "national factors" and key publics to permit a more flexible government policy toward settlement;

(c) Exertion of American "influence" over the Arab states to increase their flexibility toward Israel and on settlement;

(d) Use of indirect pressure through third parties to induce a settlement;

(e) Change in the stated American position over Israeli retention of the "occupied territories" prior to a general settlement.

Military Options: Within the context of existing military supply commitments to Israel, and anticipated Congressional pressures, a number of basic military options seem to be available.

(a) Variation in the level and schedule of delivery of arms and weapon systems to Israel. Such variations must be viewed on both quantiative and qualitative levels, including the export of advanced technology for domestic (Israeli) manufacture of certain systems;

(b) Long-term guarantees of military supply, to reduce Israeli uncertainty and apprehension over security due to supply considerations;

(c) Use of international forces as a stabilizing and peacekeeping measure;

(d) Use of reciprocal stabilizing measures;

(e) Encouragement of multi-lateral force reductions in the Middle East.

<u>Economic and Other Options</u>: Closely related to the political and military options are additional measures which could be implemented to reduce tension and increase the stability of both Israel and the Middle East region. Such measures could include:

(a) Direct economic aid and assistance to Israel, as well as several of the "non-oil" Arab states;

(b) Encouragement of additional economic intercourse between Israel and the Arab states;

(c) Introduction of economic operations owned by the United States or multi-national corporations serving both Israel and the Arab states.

3.2 IMPACT OF ISRAELI POLICY

Introduction

Here we review some earlier findings in terms of the net impact
of current Israeli policy on American supply efforts, and American
initiatives to bring about a negotiated settlement to the general
Middle East conflict. The focus here, and one central to the effective-
ness of American policy, is on the Israeli leaders' perceptions of the
U.S. role and options and expectation of long-term American support.

Considered are some of the perceptions, demands and expectations
of both the present Israeli political and military leadership as well
as alternative elements which may figure in future government coalitions.
Important here are some of the changes that have taken place because
of the March 1975 Kissinger mission to achieve a second stage interim
agreement.

Present Israeli Leadership Demands

As considered earlier, the present political and military
leadership of Israel represents a range of perceptions on most
political and military questions. Not the least of these are the demands
and expectations placed on United States policy.

Political Demands: The major Israeli political demand continues
to be recognition and reaffirmation of Israel's right to exist as
a sovereign state within secure and recognized borders. This is the
position of all members of the present as well as any forseeable future

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leadership.

Recognition of Israel's right to such peaceful existence has been a basic tenet of American foreign policy since Israel's creation in 1948.[8] What has taken on operational significance, since the 1973 War, is the Israeli expectation that the United States employ its growing influence over the Arab states toward this end, recognizing this right both de facto and de jure.

Here the nature and extent of American efforts can effectively be varied to meet overall policy objectives. Further, the role recognition would play as an element of the "non-belligerency" demanded by Israel is presently a matter of considerable internal debate there.

A second concern of the present Israeli leadership arises over the American position with respect to continued occupation of territories captured during and after the 1967 war, and recognition of an independent Palestinian entity: that is, the so-called Palestinian question.

The territorial aspect of the Arab/Israeli conflict presents perhaps the greatest problem for American policy, at least in the short run. In light of U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, as well as developing relationships with the Arab states, the United States has an interest in an equitable return of the territories. At the same time, in the absence of a final settlement, U.S. policy planners must face Israeli demands that substantial amounts of territory be retained for security reasons.

Since the present Israeli leadership recognizes that most of the territories must ultimately be returned, the dilemma posed for U.S. policy is mitigated. The variability which exists here, at least with respect to Israel, comes over the extent to which the U.S. attempts to influence Israeli withdrawal in advance of an overall settlement, and the nature and degree to which the U.S., both in public and private, recognizes Arab claims to return of the land.

The political aspect of the Palestinian problem arises over the form of an Israeli demand that the U.S. continue its refusal to recognize an independent Palestinian state and the P.L.O. in particular. While the U.S. has obliquely recognized the "rights of the Palestinian people" it has yet to accord the P.L.O., or any other group seeking legitimacy, recognition.

Military Demands: Since 1948, Israel has faced a continual struggle to obtain weapons of sufficient quality and quantity to meet the Arab threat of superior numbers of armed forces.[9] Since 1967, and increasingly since the 1973 War, these demands have fallen on the United States. The U.S. has, in turn, undertaken the role of Israel's principal arms supplier.

Although Israel's demands for advanced weapons systems have become increasingly complex and extensive, no demand for American forces has been or is likely to be made. For a number of military and political reasons, the Israeli leadership is unlikely to request the introduction of foreign forces under any circumstances. If necessary, it is more likely that Israel would seek to exercise some

nuclear option.

The principal Israeli demand is, and will continue to be, for increases in American military support, both on a quantitative and qualitative level. Examples of these demands are pending requests for the F-15 aircraft, Lance missiles, KC-135 tankers, advanced ECM and ECCM equipment, laser and electro-optical guided ordinance.

On another level, an increase can be anticipated in Israeli requests for weapons system technology, which would allow Israel to meet more of its advanced system needs through domestic manufacture.[10]

American acquiescence to the latter set of demands would no doubt serve to reduce Israeli uncertainty and increase American credibility, but at the inevitable cost of some control over the Middle East arms balance. The extent to which such demands can be met raises a serious question for United States policy.

Alternative Leadership Demands

A subject considered at some length above has been the policy flexibility available to alternative Israeli governments. The two primary alternatives to the present Labor-dominated coalition are: a "national" unity government, still dominated by the Ma'arach, but including the opposition Likud and NRP parties, and a Likud-Rafi government, in which the remains of Mapai would become an opposition party.

In either case, the Likud would become a factor in the government, rather than the opposition, and under such circumstances, it is likely that the demands placed on the United States would be similar to

those at present. Further, this would likely facilitate a more flexible policy for Israel. Simply put, the _Likud_ as a restraining factor outside the government would no longer exist. Within the government, it would be subject to the same policy pressures and parameters as the present leadership. Even under the current political alignment, opposition demands on the U.S. do not appear to go far beyond those of the government.[11]

Militarily, the opposition parties have generally deferred to the IDF leadership. Indeed, one interesting outcome of the 1973 War has been the lack of discord between the alignment and opposition parties over fundamental strategic matters. Virtually all parties, including the major ones, support the position of Defense Minister Peres and CoS Gur.[12]

Outcome of Settlement Negotiations

The impasse reached between Israel and Egypt during the March 1975 Kissinger mission has brought about a period of general policy reassessment in Israel, as well as in the United States. Thus, any analysis of the impact of Israel's settlement efforts on U.S. policy would be premature. Some interim observations are, however, possible.

In the aftermath of the March 1975 negotiations toward a second stage interim agreement and subsequent American efforts to increase Israeli policy flexibility, a majority of the present Israeli leadership have thus far prevailed in their desire to maintain a firm Israeli negotiating position.[13] This position vis-a-vis the United States has

been summed up in the Israeli press:

> The Government believes that current application of
> pressure by Washington is designed to soften Israel's
> stance, so that Dr. Kissinger can try once more -- with
> better hope of success -- to forge a U.S. orchestrated
> interim accord before Geneva. Despite the Secretary of
> State's hopes, however, the Government here is planning
> no new initiative, but intends rather to explain to the
> world and especially American public opinion, why it could
> go no further on the suspended Kissinger talks.[14]

An increasing minority of the government are, however, pushing

for additional Israeli concessions in the hope of breaking the dead-

lock.

Present Israeli policy on the Sinai is in effect summarized in

three alternative proposals:

(a) A separate agreement peace with Egypt in which Israel
would cede the vast bulk of Sinai.

(b) A non-belligerency pact in which Israel would withdraw from
the entire Gulf of Suez coast to a line well east of the
Mitla and Gidi passes, yielding over half of the Sinai
peninsula to Egypt.

(c) A modest accord in which the political return would be limited
to a "non-use of force formula" and Israel would withdraw
only midway through the passes, without an Egyptian commitment
to end the state of war.

3.3 POTENTIAL FOR AMERICAN INFLUENCE

Introduction

Even prior to the reassessment undertaken following the March 1975 Kissinger mission,[15] it was clear that the range of policies open to American planners in the Middle East was severely limited by a host of political and military factors. As a result of the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia, as well as developing relations with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China (CPR), American flexibility has become subject to an increasingly tight set of bounds, many of which are beyond the control of the policy-makers.[16] Here we consider some of the types of influence and alternative policy options available to U.S. policy-makers. First among these are the demands placed on the United States by the Israeli leadership and the actual policy flexibility available to this leadership.

Second, virtually any American action or policy is subject to such domestic factors as overall U.S. policy, available financial and military resources, Congressional reaction and public opinion.[17]

Third, any American policy or effort to exert influence must take into account the actions of third parties, including the Soviet Union, as well as the Arab states and other nations with interests at stake.

Types of Influence Available

Any American policy, or effort, to influence a settlement in

the Middle East will most likely contain political, military and economic elements. While interrelated, these broad areas suggest the basic types of influence open to the United States in its effort to maintain the security of the region and promote an overall settlement.

Political Influence: Turning first to the political element, a wide range of alternatives appears to be available to affect Israeli policy and policy flexibility. Before any action is taken, however, it is necessary to consider the key public and individual leaders to be targeted, and secondly the specific policy or aims to be promoted.

The groups to be influenced range from the top three in the present leadership to the entire set of opposition parties and other key publics.[18] Roughly in order of importance, the following are both subject and sensitive to changes in American policy:

(a) The top three Israeli leaders: namely, Rabin, Peres and Allon

(b) The entire Cabinet

(c) The Ma'arach (Alignment) Central Committee

(d) The opposition Likud bloc

(e) Senior staff in the Prime Ministry, Foreign Ministry, and Ministry of Defense

(f) Other key publics and Israeli public opinion as a whole.

The principal problem in targeting any policy or pressure toward a specific group is the likelihood of provoking an adverse reaction by some other key public which would block passage of a negotiated settlement in the Israeli Knesset.[19]

Such constraints appear to severely limit the type of political influence that can currently be exerted to those policies already supported by a broad spectrum of opinion. Under the present political configuration, this influence is confined to:

(a) Continued pressure on the present Israeli leadership to accept American assurances of support for Israel's right to exist as an independent nation within secure and recognized borders;

(b) Use of American influence over the Arab states to obtain at least some political accommodation with Israeli demands;

(c) Use of America's position as a superpower and world leader to bring additional pressure on the Israeli leadership to increase its policy flexibility.

In these areas the United States would appear to be taking an active role already, and it is not clear that additional pressure will produce the desired results. An additional avenue for American influence, presently unused to any major extent, is the exertion of direct political pressure on the opposition Likud. Since Israeli policy flexibility is, in practical terms, constrained by opposition pressure, it appears to be in the American interest to try and reduce this pressure where possible.

Military Influence: As Israel's principal arms supplier, the United States is in a position to exert considerable pressure on the Israeli leadership. Indeed this is the most obvious and probably the most efficacious avenue of influence. Unfortunately, its limitations, as well as potential counter-productive effects, have not always been taken into full account.

On the one hand, the United States has sought to increase Israel's policy flexibility by delaying or withholding delivery of certain promised weapons systems,[20] while at the same time attempting to convince Israeli leadership that assurances of future American military support are credible. Thus, it is not surprising that some within the Israeli leadership have openly questioned the validity of American assurances. As Defense Minister Shimon Peres has recently stated:

> With American assurances going up in flames all over
> the world, I think we made the right decision (in
> March 1975)[21]

Given this fundamental credibility problem the question remains as to what avenues are open to American policy. Here the answer would appear to lie in three areas: decisions on fundamental supply questions; decisions on the quantitative/qualitative mix of American military aid and decisions on basic defense technology transfer to Israel.

In the first area, it is apparent that the United States has already employed decisions, and changes in decisions, on basic

weapons system supply questions on a short-term basis in an effort
to change Israeli policy. As indicated, these policies have demonstrated
some limited effectiveness, but may have already damaged the long-
run credibility of the United States as an arms supplier of Israel.

While it is not suggested holdbacks be abandoned, it is recom-
mended that such efforts be kept within clearly defined bounds in order
to avoid irreparable damage to long-run U.S. credibility.

A second area for American influence lies in the quantitative/
qualitative mix of military support. To the extent that advanced
weapons can be used to increase Israeli policy flexibility, this
possibility has been referred to as the "territory for technology"
tradeoff.

Such aid is, however, clearly limited by the potential danger
of advanced systems falling into Soviet hands, which might adversely
affect the U.S./U.S.S.R. technology gap.

The third area involves direct technology transfer to Israel.
Transfers could be valuable for a number of reasons. First, a
direct technology transfer reduces Israeli dependence on on-going
and future military support, helping to overcome the credibility
problem. Secondly, such transfers would increase Israeli security,
and Israeli perceptions of their security position.[22] Third, such
transfers would reduce to some extent Israeli demands on limited
American resources.

Economic Aid: As Israel's economic situation becomes increasingly
severe, the potential for American aid and influence increases in this

sphere. Since the majority of the Israeli national budget is devoted to defense, American aid has already provided a great measure of relief from a burden that would otherwise be unbearable.

In addition to the military and economic assistance provided by the U.S. Government, the American Jewish community has been instrumental in supporting Israel through humanitarian relief programs and through the provision of much long-term development capital (Israel Bond sales). Here American policy has been highly favorable to the collection and transfer of such funds. [23]

Assurances of long-term economic support could serve to increase Israel's ability to fund more of her defense needs domestically, thereby increasing perceptions of domestic security. Further, economic aid provides the U.S. with considerable leverage over Israeli public opinion, which is extremely sensitive to changes in its standard of living. Because of its small population, even minimal amounts of economic aid are likely to have a highly visible impact.

Assurance of a continuous supply of energy would reduce Israel's dependence on the Abu Rhudeis oil fields in occupied Sinai. Finally, since the long-run security of Israel depends on its economic integration with the Arab world, the U.S. is in a position to implement a number of cooperative economic measures and ventures which could serve to reduce Arab-Israeli tension and provide the basis for positive Arab-Israeli relationships.

Influence Over Israel's Military Leadership

The primary objective in any effort directed at influencing the Israeli military leadership must be directed toward promoting the belief that Israel's security can be maintained within the 4 June 1967 borders and that the United States remains committed to the maintenance of Israel's vital defense needs within these parameters.

Central to this is the on-going supply of advanced weapons systems, as well as the American position with respect to the ultimate disposition of the occupied territories.

Given the present perceptions of the strategic situation by the IDF leadership, it should be an aim of American policy to stress the following points:

(a) That the United States will not support any "decisive victory" that might be sought by the IDF leadership in any renewed, full-scale fighting, which includes a Suez Canal crossing or other major territorial conquest by Israel;

(b) That the United States will be hard-pressed to make massive transfers of military equipment in another full-scale war;

(c) That the United States remains committed to maintaining Israel's security, and meeting Israel's vital defense needs.

For American defense planners the crucial task thus becomes one of convincing their counterparts in the IDF that Israel's security can be maintained within the 1967 borders, as part of a general settlement, and that the United States remains committed to

maintaining Israel's security within the Middle East.

Influence Over the Israeli Political Leadership

While the Israeli political leadership is in many respects as sensitive to changes in U.S. policy as the IDF leadership, it appears subject to a broader set of domestic pressures. Since the present coalition is both narrow and weak,[24] it is far more susceptible to influence than the military.

As mentioned, the political leadership is subject to political, as well as military and economic influence. Indeed, the most effective American effort is likely to be a coordinated policy combining all three elements. Hence any effort directed at an Israeli policy utilizing the American supply of weapons, must also contain political elements to prepare Israel's political opposition and public opinion for such a shift. Further, alternatives should be explored for either promoting an expanded unity government or applying pressure directly on the opposition parties.

Other Alternatives for Influence

A number of additional avenues appear to be open for the United States to both influence Israeli policy and reduce the uncertainty that exists within the Israeli leadership and populace over American intentions and reliability.

In addition to the political parties, which were considered above, most of the groups identified previously have significant connection

and contacts with the United States which can be utilized to transmit the American position.

Orthodox Judaism in Israel, which in turn controls the influential NRP (National Religious Party) has a strong connection with the Jewish communities in New York and other American cities. Here, the leaders of the American Jewish community could be utilized to make clear both the ongoing commitment of the United States to Israel's security as well as some of the practical constraints on American policy.

Since academic exchanges between American and Israeli universities are extensive, it is possible to utilize the academic community as a resource in generating support for a more flexible Israeli policy. As discussed, the academic community in Israel already forms the basis of support for a more flexible policy of concession and accommodation and should be receptive to additional American efforts. [25]

Finally, every effort should be made to prepare Israeli public opinion for the type of policy and concessions that will ulitmately be necessary if an overall settlement is to be reached. Here, the Israeli leadership has done a poor job since the 1973 War. [26]

Any use of American influence in any of these areas is not likely to produce an immediate or dramatic change in Israel's policy flexibility, but a coordinated policy directed at several key publics, that takes into account the tensions and centrifugal forces within Israeli society, stands the best change of bringing about the flexibility necessary to bring about a negotiated settlement.

3.4 AMERICAN INCENTIVES AND ASSURANCES

Introduction

A major aspect of any American policy designed to promote an overall settlement in the Middle East is the set of incentives the U.S. can offer the parties to the conflict to negotiate and the assurances of continued security following a settlement. While it is recognized that any settlement requires American assurances to the Arab states concerned, as well as Israel, such policy is beyond the scope of the present research.[27]

Admittedly, the present discussion of American assurances comes at a particularly trying time for United States foreign policy. On an objective basis, it is difficult to underestimate the impact of the American experience in Southeast Asia and deterioration in NATO's Southern flank on current Israeli thinking. The quotatation from Defense Minister Peres (above) is but one example of the seemingly endless analogy that is now pouring forth from the Israeli leadership and press alike.[28]

Still, a substantial element within the Israeli leadership and public alike recognizes the crucial differences with the Southeast Asia analogy, and the truly massive nature of the actual American effort over the past decade in this area. Clearly it is upon these positive aspects of the Southeast Asian assistance program that the United States must build its credibility within the Middle East in general, and Israel in particular.

Finally, it is necessary to stress to the Israeli leadership that although there is some degree of risk in any American assurance, the long-run risks to Israeli security in the absence of an overall settlement are far greater. In an imperfect world, acceptance of American assurances by Israel may prove to be the far lesser of two "evils".

Bilateral Agreements

For some years now there has been discussion in Israel about the possibility of reaching a bilateral security agreement with the United States. At one time it was generally believed that the solution to all of Israel's security and defense problems could be found in obtaining such an agreement.[29] It was felt that a formal American commitment to the security of the Jewish state would be both a deterrent to Arab first strikes and an incentive for the Arab states to follow up on the Rhodes Agreement, turning the 1949 Armistice lines into final recognized and secure borders.

Following the 1967 War and Israeli occupation of Arab territory, the perceived usefulness of such bilateral accords declined. On the one hand, Israeli policy-makers believed that such an agreement could not be obtained without major territorial concessions by Israel, and, on the other, that, in light of the Vietnam experience, the American Congress and public as a whole did not appear receptive to the though of additional American commitments.[30]

In light of the Israeli and American policy assessments that

took place after the 1973 War and the subsequent disengagement agreements negotiated under United States auspices, the use of bilateral agreements and assurances has again become a viable objective for American policy.

First, because of Israel's pressing need for American military assistance in any prolonged fighting, an agreement covering the provision of such material under well-defined circumstances could serve to decrease the uncertainty faced by Israel's defense planners and increase the level of Israel's security under conditions of a negotiated settlement. Here it is interesting to note the recent statement by Egyptian President Sadat that, in effect, he saw nothing wrong with the United States guaranteeing Israel's security within the 4 June 1967 borders.[31]

While it is unclear that Congressional support exists for a bilateral agreement, it would seem that such an assurance would be a major step in maintaining Middle East security within the context of an Israeli withdrawal from oecupied territories.

Second, it is probably necessary to couple with any military assurance a political agreement formally recognizing Israel's unconditional right to exist as a sovereign state within secure borders. Since this principle is already an essential element of United States policy, its formalization presents little problem.

For the United States, the hard policy questions in making any bilateral agreement with Israel come over the nature and extent of the military assurances it might contain. Here any definitive

commitment necessarily limits the ability of the U.S. to utilize
defense support to induce policy changes. At the same time such
commitments may bring about the specific policy changes sought.
Here, such bilateral agreements are indeed a two-edged sword, and
can only be used with the utmost care.

For Israel, in the midst of a highly critical and dynamic
security situation, acceptance of bilateral guarantees leaves the
two basic questions of what Israel's strategic position becomes
even given guarantees and to what extent such guarantees will be
honored in a future crisis. While the answers to these difficult
questions may never be certain, the opportunity for settlement that
these assurances present may be far less risky than the alternatives.

International Forces and Stabilizing Measures

One possible incentive discussed from time to time has been
the possible use of a joint Soviet-American force to maintain the
security of negotiated borders. Needless to say, the use of U.S.
troops as a component of any international force raises a host of
domestic and international problems.

As a positive incentive, such a force would be a more credible
deterrent to violation of a settlement accord than the UNEF of the
1957-1967 period. Further, such a force would be a symbol of join
Soviet-American commitment to peace and security in the Middle East
region. Indeed, any international force would help prevent a re-
militarization by the Arabs or Israelis of the sensitive Sinai buffer,

as well as other crucial areas and would act as an early warning of
settlement violations.

Previous experience in trying to stabilize the area would seem
to suggest that an international force be interposed between the
parties as a buffer for an interim stabilizing period and will
necessarily be a part of any negotiated settlement. Thus, the
question for all parties concerned becomes one of how a force
can be composed to best meet these objectives.

Here some have raised the argument that the stronger the force
used in securing the peace, the greater the chance that such a
settlement will be respected. While the present analysis does not
follow this line of argument, it is suggested that an American
assurance to Israel of a reasonably strong buffer force, whether an
American-Soviet force or some other, with the stipulation that
unilateral expulsion by either side would constitute a causus belli,
could help increase Israeli policy flexibility.

Economic Incentives

While not as directly related to Israel's defense and security
policy flexibility as the supply of advanced weapons systems, there
are nonetheless a set of possible economic incentives which the
United States can employ to expand such policy flexibility.

Fundamental to any analysis of the Israeli economy and its
relationship to Israeli security is the realization that security and
defense are the principal considerations in any Israeli economic policy.

Thus, the critical need for advanced weapons systems to maintain
strategic superiority over the Arab states has brought Israel
the highest income tax (percentage wise) and defense expenditure
rate (as a percentage of the national budget) of any nation in the
world.

Given Israel's secondary goals of maintaining real economic
growth and attaining living standards comparable to Western Europe,
an enormous strain has been put on the Israeli economy. Added to
this has been the enormous economic cost of the 1973 War[32] and the
impact of the 1974-75 world economic recession.

Thus, any economic assistance which Israel is able to obtain
externally, whether for direct defense expenditures or in the
civilian economy, increases Israel's ability to meet its perceived
defense needs.[33]

The major economic incentive available to the United States
has been direct military assistance. Clearly the American decision
to supply some $2.2 billion in aid to Israel during the 1973 War,
as well as subsequent support, has given the United States far
greater influence over Israeli policy than any other factor. Despite
the desire of the Israeli leadership to be self-sufficient militarily,
this goal is no longer realistic given the advanced state of non-
nuclear warfare in the Middle East.[34]

Given an American policy commitment to supply Israeli defense
requirements at specific quantitative and qualitative levels, consider-
able flexibility exists for United States policy in the percentages of

outright grant, long-term credits and cash sales in any total aid package. Here it may be possible to utilize higher percentages of grants and long-term credits, rather than cash sales, to induce some additional policy flexibility.

Moving beyond military assistance, an entire range of economic aid and incentive programs are available for United States policy makers, keeping in mind the fact that even such non-military aid ultimately frees Israeli resources for defense purposes. Further, by developing the economic base in Israel, the United States is also serving its own strategic objective of promoting long-run security in the Middle East based on an economically viable Israel.

As part of any proposed interim or final settlement accords, the U.S. is in a position to offer all parties to the conflict a number of specific economic incentives, which will serve to reduce tension and form the basis for long-run security. Offered for example in this category are enterprises such as:

(a) Facilities owned by U.S. or multinational corporations which are jointly used by Arab and Israeli consumers, such as fresh water plants, toll roads, and similar enterprises needed by both parties.

(b) Transportation of Israeli bound cargos through be Suez Canal and to the Israeli port of Eilat.

(c) Transportation and communication links between the Arab world and Israel utilizing American or multinational carriers.

Pressure on the Arab States

One final area in which the United States may be able to offer some incentives to the Israeli leadership to bring about a settlement stems from the unique position of the United States as the only super-power with influence, communication, and working relations with the parties to the conflict.

Here the possibility exists that the United States may use as an incentive to Israel its best efforts to bring about greater flexibility in Arab policy.[35] Further, since Israel is highly dependent, at least with respect to weapons systems delivery, on an American defense policy skewed toward Israel, any suggestion of a more "even-handed" policy on the part of the United States has considerable leverage over Israel policy-making.

3.5 OTHER CATALYSTS TO SETTLEMENT

Introduction

In addition to those basic areas considered above in which the
United States can formulate its policy so as to bring about maximum
flexibility in the Israeli negotiating position, there remain several
other options and actions that could be taken by U.S. policy-planners
which would serve to improve relations with the Israeli leadership.
The aim here is to secure a general reduction of uncertainty and
tensions in the Middle East, thereby creating the conditions under
which the parties are able to negotiate a settlement.

While the three areas addressed below, namely American/Israeli,
American/Soviet and American/Arab relations have all been covered
in related contexts above, the problems isolated are all important
ones in terms of American/Israeli relations, and hence in any
consideration of policy designed to achieve maximum flexibility.

Reduction of American/Israeli Noise Problems

One of the major problems confronting American/Israeli relations,
and the inability of the present Israeli leadership to adopt a more
flexible policy position, stems from the very nature of this relationship.

Under the present structure, all policy-level communication on
the Israeli side is routed through Premier Rabin and Israeli Ambassador
to the United States Simcha Dinitz. Since Rabin does not speak for a
united Cabinet, and Dinitz is held in low regard by a substantial

element of the Israeli leadership, a major problem in communication immediately arises.[36]

The net effect of this arrangement is that the IDF leadership, as well as the pivotal members of the Israeli government (such as Defense Minister Peres), have limited means of direct and confidential access to American policy-makers.[37]

On the American side, there has developed a similar "channeling" of contact through the Secretary of State. While advantages exist in consolidation of communication through one channel from some policy purposes, this situation has given rise to noise problems which have in themselves served to limit policy flexibility.

The implication here, for both the United States and Israel, is to take positive measures to establish new communication links and improve existing ones between U.S. policy-makers and the broad spectrum of the Israeli leadership.

Once a common basis of understanding is achieved, the larger policy problems may in fact be reduced. Further, since many of the "roadblocks" to policy flexibility come over matters of complex strategic and defense policy, it would appear highly desirable that an ongoing dialogue about these matters at the policy analysis level be instituted between American and Israeli defense planners. This dialogue would by no means seek to pre-empt diplomatic exchanges, but would rather augment these efforts by clarifying the fundamental problems.

Pressure on the Soviet Union

One of the major factors in any consideration of settlement in
the Middle East is the role of the Soviet Union.[38] As co-chairman
of the Geneva Conference and as a partner to the emerging Soviet-
American detente, the United States is in a position to exercise
some influence on the Soviets toward promoting an overall settlement
in the Middle East.

While it has been the aim of recent American policy in the Middle
East to relegate the Soviets to a secondary role, it is nevertheless
crucial to the long-run security of the area that the Soviet Union
support any final settlement. In brief, it would seem necessary
to bring the Soviets in on a constructive basis; otherwise a high
probability exists for their interposing themselves in a role less
conducive to peace.[39]

End of the Arab Economic Boycott

One final area in which the United States could work to increase
the chances for an overall settlement lies in reducing the international
climate of hostility that exists between Israel and the Arab states.
In addition to the propaganda involved, and the question of terrorist
activities, a major element of anti-Israel policy has been the use
of the Arab economic boycott. While the boycott of Israel and firms
dealing with it has had a varying economic impact, it has produced
a good deal of irritation within the Israeli leadership.

As indicated, a major part of the Israeli economy is keyed
to international trade and thus Israeli businessmen and leaders
alike have become sensitized to the boycott. Whatever the justi-
fication and status of it under international law, the boycott has
certainly reinforced the arguments of those who claim that Arab
intentions to negotiate a settlement and end hostility are not
sincere.

Any U.S. effort which is successful at mitigating or eliminating
the boycott would certainly serve to influence Israeli policy-makers.
To the extent that the United States is successful in reducing or
eliminating the boycott the flexibility open to the Israeli leadership
is increased.

NOTES

PART THREE

1. Also of importance, but not covered in the present research, is the role of other factors, such as superpower relations in the making of U.S. defense policy in the Middle East. See McLaurin and Mughisuddin, op. cit., A. S. Becker, The Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1970-1973 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, P-5167, December 1973) and Paul Y. Hammond and Sidney S. Alexander (eds.) Political Dynamics in the Middle East (New York: Elsevier, 1972).

2. While no explicit analysis of American objectives is included here, it is implicitly assumed that U.S. policy makers are seeking to achieve a just and stable settlement in the Middle East, within the context of superpower detente. See here Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report FY-1976 and FY197T (Washington: USGPO, 1975).

3. See Becker, op. cit, pp. 49-50.

4. The year 1969 is chosen because of the advent of the Nixon administration, which was perceived by Israel as being firmly committed to Israel's existence. Note here the remarks of then Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Yitzhak Rabin:

> "I do not recall that any previous U.S. President undertook commitments as President Nixon during his speech to the joint meeting of the two houses of Congress after the Moscow talks, when he said: 'I reemphasized to the Russians the American people's commitment to the existence of the State of Israel'"

Rabin did, however, interject the following caveat:

> "On the other hand, I repeat that the lesson we learned on the eve of the (1967) Six Day War should be imprinted in our minds and should remind us that when the die is cast and we face the test, we find ourselves alone, face-to-face with our fate."

Interview on Israeli radio, 10 June 1972, from FBIS.

5. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

6. These concerns were voiced to the author in a series of interviews conducted in Israel, March 1975.

7. See, for example, The New York Times, 27 March 1975.

8. See, for example, Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1971) and Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy (revised) (New York: Norton, 1969).

9. This history is found in Shimon Peres, David's Sling, op. cit. For a recent view of the balance by Peres see interview in Der Spiegel (Hamburg) (in German), 26 May 1975, pp. 96-106. Reported in PBIS, 30 May 1975, pp. N4-N9.

10. In the near future, these demands will fall in the area of advanced ECM and ECCM technology. Here it is believed that given basic technical and circuit design, actual systems can be manufactured by Israel's electronic industry.

11. See, for example, interview with Dr. Elimelech Rimalt, Jerusalem Domestic Service (in Hebrew) 23 March 1975. Reported in FBIS 25 March 1975, p. N-7.

12. See note 6 above.

13. An informal analysis of this position and the developments which led to it are contained in Bernard Gwertzman, "Failure of Kissinger's Mideast Mission Traced to Major Miscalculations," The New York Times, 7 April 1975, p. 12.

14. David Landau, "Jerusalem to sit tight in hope U.S. anger will blow over" the Jerusalem Post, 7 April 1975, p. 1.

15. Here the reader is referred to the NSSM-220 report.

16. Such a trend has been clear for some years now. See, for example, Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 243-347.

17. A possible exception to some of these factors is clandestine activity. The climate for such activity has become decreasingly receptive in recent years.

18. Clearly there will be considerable "spillover", but it would appear possible to exert some influence nonetheless.

19. This is a particularly important consideration in the present Knesset, where the alignment (Ma'arach) does not command an effective majority.

20. The assumption here being that by withholding various weapons systems, the military alternative will somehow appear less attractive to the Israeli leadership. It is not clear that this assumption is universally shared by the Israeli leadership.

21. Quoted on NBC "Nightly News" 12 April 1975.

22. Important here is the Israeli psychological need for self-sufficiency and self-reliance in arms supply. See here the recent statement by Defense Minister Peres, Jerusalem Post, 14 April 1975.

23. Witness, for example, favorable U.S. securities rulings on Israel Bonds, and favorable tax treatment for donations to Israel-related charities.

24. This situation defies Riker's general notion on coalition stability known as the "size principle". See William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

25. See, for example, reports of the recent meeting between U.S. Senator George McGovern and Professor Amnon Rubenstein of Tel Aviv University, Jerusalem Post, 6 April 1975, p. 2.

26. It is interesting to note that the Israeli public is now demanding a "signed" document from Egyptian President Sadat, a notion that would have been out of the question only a few years ago.

27. Indeed, a general settlement will not only require American assurances to all of the major parties, but some assurances from the Soviet Union and major European nations as well. A recent step in this direction appears to have been taken by the U.S.S.R. See Davar (in Hebrew), 13 June 1975, pp. 13, 14.

28. See also, Moshe Dayan, "Dayan: 'There is a Lesson From Vietnam'," Los Angeles Times, 17 April 1975, p. 7.

29. See Rosenne, op. cit. Alas, this perception, held at a time when such an agreement was unfeasible for the United States, was probably an example of the "grass is greener" thesis.

30. At least Foreign Minister Abba Eban was told this much by President Johnson at the time. Wagner (1974:2) and Lucius D. Battle, Foreign Policy, (Spring, 1974).

31. Interview with John Chancellor, broadcast over NBC, 5 April 1975.

32. Originally estimated at some $5.5 billion, more recent Israeli estimates place the cost in excess of $8 billion. In effect,

Israel has lost over an entire year of its GNP.

33. For many years Israel has marketed long-term "development" bonds in the U.S., as well as in other nations, with the claim that such funds are for development purposes only. To the extent that "development" capital frees additional Israeli tax revenue and borrowing power for defense purposes, the Israel bonds program is a vital part of defense financing. In addition, favorable U.S. tax treatment given to charitable deductions for Israeli causes through American "friends" organizations promotes a level of aid greater than would otherwise be the case.

34. Some leaders, such as Defense Minister Peres, still assert the existence of such limited or non-dependence. Interview with the author, Tel Aviv, March 1975.

35. Several in the Israeli leadership have clearly sought to put the U.S. in this position.

36. The ultimate seriousness of such problems can be seen in the case of former Foreign Minister Abba Eban during the 1967 crisis. See Wagner, (1974:2) op. cit. and Battle, op. cit.

37. This problem was addressed to the author in an interview with Defense Minister Peres, Tel Aviv, March 1975.

38. See McLaurin and Mughisuddin, op. cit.

39. See Yigal Allon, interview in L'Express (in French) 5-11 May 1975, p. 56. Reported in FBIS, 8 May 1975, p. N-3.

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
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